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Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law 
Adjudication:  Rules and Standards 
DAVID O. TAYLOR 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
exists, at least in part, to achieve goals related to patent law that the 
Supreme Court singularly failed to achieve.  Since the Federal 
Circuit’s inception just over thirty years ago, however, critics have 
shifted blame for problems with the patent system from the Supreme 
Court to the Federal Circuit.  A common criticism that has gained 
strength is that the Federal Circuit engages in overly formalistic 
adjudication in patent cases.  One aspect of this criticism is that the 
Federal Circuit too often creates rules to govern patent law.  In this 
Article, I challenge that critique and defend the Federal Circuit’s 
practice of considering the appropriateness of a rule-based 
adjudicatory approach to patent law in the context of the present 
institutional structure.  After evaluating the history of the Supreme 
Court’s oversight of the Federal Circuit and assessing normative 
bases for the use of rules in patent law, this Article suggests a 
framework for evaluating the appropriate degree of rule-based 
adjudication in patent law.  In short, this Article develops and 
defends the position that the Federal Circuit’s consideration of rule-
based adjudication reflects not only the expected but also the 
preferred practice of a semi-specialized intermediate appellate court 
whose development of patent law is subject to discretionary review 
by a generalized court of last resort. 
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Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law 
Adjudication:  Rules and Standards 
DAVID O. TAYLOR* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Critics of the patent system in the United States, prior to formation of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, often focused 
their criticism on the United States Supreme Court.  Sensing an 
overburdened Supreme Court or, worse, indifference toward patent law 
and its underlying policies, they criticized the Supreme Court based on the 
existence of unresolved splits of authority regarding patent law principles 
among the regional circuit courts of appeals.1  They viewed the Supreme 
Court’s neglect of the patent system as creating or at least contributing to 
several problems, including excessive forum shopping, high litigation 
costs, low quality adjudication, and a lack of certainty and predictability.2  
Moreover, when the Supreme Court did decide patent cases, critics 
detected an anti-patent bias.3  In short, regardless of whether the Supreme 
Court granted or denied certiorari in patent cases, critics found reason to 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law.  Harvard Law School, J.D., 2003; 
Texas A&M University, B.S., 1999.  This Article was funded in part by the John C. Biggers Faculty 
Research Fund.  I am grateful for the opportunity to present this Article at the IP Scholars Conference 
at Stanford Law School and the Patent Conference at Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent 
College of Law.  Thanks to Kevin Collins, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Paul Gugliuzza, Mark Lemley, David 
Olson, Daniel Ravicher, Greg Reilly, David Schwartz, and Ned Snow for their helpful comments on the 
issues this Article addresses.  Austin Teng provided excellent research assistance.  Special thanks go to 
Rachel, Caroline, and Emily Taylor.  The views expressed in this Article, as well as any errors, are my 
own. 
1 See, e.g., Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs & Patent Appeals, 77 
F.R.D. 63, 92 (1977) (quoting Professor Gambrell’s remark that Supreme Court Justices “haven’t 
resolved all the conflicts, obviously, and part of the reason . . . is that they don’t handle enough patent 
related issues in order to get the kind of grasp on them and interest in them that’s necessary to provide a 
monitoring function”); Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys. Structure & Internal 
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 371 (1975) (“It is our view that the 
principal cause of circuit-to-circuit deviations in the patent field stems from a lack of guidance and 
monitoring by a single court whose judgments are nationally binding. . . . The Supreme Court is just 
too busy to perform anything even resembling a monitoring function on patent-related issues.”). 
2 Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs & Patent Appeals, 77 F.R.D. 
at 77. 
3 This criticism emanated from external critics, as well as the Supreme Court itself.  See 
Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only 
patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”); Tom Arnold & Jack 
Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1257 n.50 (1970) (noting an “antipatent bias of the 
Supreme Court”). 
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fault the Supreme Court. 
Based on the failure of the Supreme Court to resolve divergent 
authority in the regional circuit courts of appeals, critics for decades sought 
the creation of a single intermediate appellate court to hear appeals in 
patent cases.4  They did so to strengthen the U.S. patent system, foster 
technological growth and industrial innovation, eliminate forum shopping 
among the regional courts of appeal, and increase uniformity and reduce 
uncertainty in substantive patent law.5  They ultimately succeeded in 
persuading Congress and the President to establish the Federal Circuit in 
1982 and vest it, rather than the regional circuit courts of appeals, with 
near-exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases.6  Thus, now the 
Federal Circuit exists as a semi-specialized court with nationwide 
jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases at least in part to achieve goals 
related to patent law that the Supreme Court singularly failed to achieve. 
As a matter of institutional design, however, when Congress and the 
President created the Federal Circuit, they did not eliminate the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction to review the judgments of the Federal Circuit in 
patent cases.7  Nonetheless, during the Federal Circuit’s first decade, the 
Supreme Court issued only one writ of certiorari related to substantive 
patent law to the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Federal Circuit’s judgment and adopted its reasoning in that case.8 
                                                                                                                          
4 See Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys. Structure & Internal Procedures: 
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. at 371 (suggesting the “creation of a national court” with 
“statutory authority to review a meaningful number of patent cases each year”); Wm. Redin 
Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. 
REV. 950, 962 (1942) (recognizing “a demand for settling patent appeals in a court with nationwide 
jurisdiction”). 
5 See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19 (1981) (“The Committee is concerned that the exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent claims of the new Federal Circuit not be manipulated.  This measure is intended 
to alleviate the serious problems of forums [sic] shopping among the regional courts of appeals on 
patent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of appeals.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 
(1981) (“The establishment of a single court to hear patent appeals was repeatedly singled out by the 
witnesses who appeared before the Committee as one of the most far-reaching reforms that could be 
made to strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and 
industrial innovation.  The new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will provide nationwide 
uniformity in patent law, will make the rules applied in patent litigation more predictable and will 
eliminate the expensive, time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in 
the field.”); id. at 23 (“[T]he central purpose [in creating the Federal Circuit] is to reduce the 
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist[ed] in the administration of 
patent law.”). 
6 See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (establishing the 
Federal Circuit). 
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012) (“Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court . . . [b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil . . . case . . . .”). 
8 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 673–74 (1990) (affirming the Federal 
Circuit’s judgment based on its use of a correct interpretation of a statutory exception to infringement).  
The Supreme Court also issued two writs of certiorari to the Federal Circuit on procedural issues in the 
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Over time, however, critics have shifted the blame for problems with 
the patent system from the Supreme Court to the Federal Circuit.9  Indeed, 
some commentators now hold the Federal Circuit, rather than the Supreme 
Court, responsible for problems with the modern patent system.10  In turn, 
some now look to the Supreme Court primarily to save the public from 
misguided patent law developed by the Federal Circuit.11  In this regard, it 
is important to recognize that in recent years the Supreme Court has 
reviewed the Federal Circuit’s cases addressing patent law with increased 
frequency.12  For several years, moreover, it consistently vacated or 
reversed the Federal Circuit in patent cases13 and, even when affirming its 
                                                                                                                          
Federal Circuit’s first decade, vacating and remanding in both instances.  See Christianson v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 819 (1988) (vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision based on 
lack of jurisdiction); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (vacating the 
Federal Circuit’s judgment due to its failure to address arguments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a)). 
9 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of 
Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 789 (2008) (“[O]bservers of the patent system have voiced 
increasingly vociferous complaints about the state of patent jurisprudence, and by extension about the 
Federal Circuit.”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1621 (2007) (“[S]everal commentators and other legal actors are beginning 
to place blame for a variety of perceived ills squarely on the Federal Circuit.”). 
10 See Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
336, 340 (2005) (summarizing criticisms of the Federal Circuit’s “existence [as] a power appellate 
court,” including “prone[ness] to erratic and unpredictable decision-making[,] . . . . changing the law or 
making new law without a reasoned and persuasive reason for doing so[,] . . . . [and] endangering long 
term certainty because of its rapid and oscillating development of rules through its case law”).  Some 
critics fault the Federal Circuit generally for problems with the patent system.  See Paul R. Gugliuzza, 
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1441 (2012) (arguing for reconsideration 
of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction based on the assumption that “patent law’s problems can be traced 
in significant part to the Federal Circuit”); Timothy B. Lee, How a Rouge Appeals Court Wrecked the 
Patent System, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 30, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/how-a-
rogue-appeals-court-wrecked-the-patent-system/ (concluding that the Federal Circuit “wrecked the 
patent system”).  More often, critics fault the Federal Circuit for problems associated with specific 
patent law issues.  See, e.g., Stephen Lindholm, Marking the Software Patent Beast, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 82, 120 n.463 (2005) (“[T]he Federal Circuit was wholly responsible for allowing software 
patents in the first place . . . .”); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 266 (2008) (“[T]he 
Federal Circuit needs to set forth a more coherent and clear [claim construction] doctrine.”).  
11 See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for 
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 720 (2009) (“By periodically 
taking on merits review in areas where Federal Circuit decisions may have unduly ossified the law, the 
Supreme Court can help initiate escapes from suboptimal legal equilibria.”). 
12 See infra Part IV.B (describing the history of the Supreme Court’s criticism of the Federal 
Circuit’s adjudication of patent law cases).  
13 See, e.g., Quanta Comp., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (reversing the 
Federal Circuit’s decision); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 459 (2007) (same); KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007) (same); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (same); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (vacating 
the Federal Circuit’s decision); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (same); 
Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005) (same); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. 
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decisions, adopted alternative reasoning.14  And, significantly, in some of 
the Supreme Court’s recent opinions in patent cases, the Court has 
suggested that the Federal Circuit created improperly rigid rules.15  
Similarly, several law professors have recently criticized the Federal 
Circuit for engaging in overly formalistic rule-based adjudication in patent 
cases.16 
Condemnation of the Federal Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence as 
overly formalistic in the sense of over-use of rules has extended to many 
patent law doctrines.  Critics, for example, have accused the Federal 
Circuit of adopting a rigid rule governing the question of patent 
eligibility,17 and credited the Supreme Court for eliminating the Federal 
Circuit’s rigid rule.18  Similarly, they have blamed the Federal Circuit for 
adopting a strict rule making it difficult for patent challengers to prove that 
an invention is obvious and, therefore, undeserving of patent protection,19 
                                                                                                                          
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (same); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002) (same). 
14 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2071 (2011) (affirming using 
alternative reasoning); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (same). 
15 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415 (“We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the 
Court of Appeals.”); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394 (“[T]he Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant 
of . . . relief.”); Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 737–38 (“[W]e disagree with the decision to adopt the 
complete bar. . . . While this Court has not weighed the merits of the complete bar against the flexible 
bar in its prior cases, we have consistently applied the doctrine in a flexible way, not a rigid one.”). 
16 See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 9 (finding that the Federal Circuit has engaged in 
formalistic case parsing); Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in 
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123 (2005) (advocating that the Federal Circuit 
abandon its formalistic approach to conform to the Supreme Court’s methodology); Timothy R. 
Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity] 
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s formalistic use of rules comes at the cost of fairness); Peter Lee, 
Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & 
ARTS 405 (2012) [hereinafter Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit] (explaining that the historical 
formalism of the Federal Circuit in patent adjudication desensitizes the court to the facts of each case); 
Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Lee, Patent Law and 
the Two Cultures] (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s formalism creates a disengagement with 
technology); Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419 (2012) 
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s formalistic approach is sub-optimal); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts 
and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003) 
(asserting that the Federal Circuit’s formalistic approach has had a negative impact on innovation and 
has created a need for reform in the patent system); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 
52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003) (cautioning that the Federal Circuit must consider other priorities in 
addition to certainty and predictability). 
17 See, e.g., Robert A. Hulse & Robert R. Sachs, Making Sense of the Revived Machine-or-
Transformation Test in In re Bilski, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 12 (2009) (criticizing the 
Federal Circuit’s “rigid application of the machine-or-transformation test”). 
18 See D. Christopher Ohly, Therasense: Another Case for Rejection of Rigid Rules, 23 INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 14 (2011) (using Bilski as an example to advocate for the Supreme Court’s 
review of a Federal Circuit ruling).  
19 See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2068 (2007) (summarizing 
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and praised the Supreme Court for rejecting that rule and making it easier 
to do so.20  They have faulted the Federal Circuit for creating a 
presumption that injunctive relief follows a finding of liability for patent 
infringement,21 and lauded the Supreme Court for favoring accuracy by 
eliminating the presumption and injecting discretion into the determination 
of whether to grant injunctive relief.22 
These critics, however, largely overlook or ignore the responsibility of 
the Supreme Court for the Federal Circuit’s perceived penchant for rule-
based adjudication.23  Instead, with an apparent goal of eliminating rule-
based adjudication, they propose increasingly sweeping reforms focused 
on the Federal Circuit, its jurisdiction, and its power to develop patent law 
as a creature of the common law.  Some merely suggest that the Federal 
Circuit confront and eliminate its preference for rule-based adjudication.24  
Others, however, propose diversifying the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.25  
Still others advocate eliminating the exclusivity of the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction over patent cases.26  And some recommend giving the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”) substantive rule-making 
authority to constrict the Federal Circuit’s role in developing a common 
                                                                                                                          
critics of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation (“TSM”) test, suggesting that it is an inflexible rule 
that “causes patents to issue where the combination of preexisting technologies would have been 
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art”). 
20 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1276 (2011) 
(indicating there were “many reasons [for the Supreme Court] to reject the TSM test”); Natalie 
Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of Objective Indicia 
Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072 n.12 (2011) (supporting the prediction that 
“[i]n the wake of KSR . . . it will be easier to prove patents obvious”). 
21 See, e.g., Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit, supra note 16, at 410 (describing the 
presumption as a “syllogistic rule” that “allowed courts to largely ignore factors[,] . . . . reduce 
contextual consideration[,] and truncate legal inquiries”). 
22 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 798–99 (highlighting that in eBay the Court “explicitly 
endorsed a rule of discretion for determining whether to grant injunctive relief,” characterizing this 
development as “striking a different balance between precision and accuracy,” and favoring the latter).  
But see Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent 
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2012) (criticizing eBay for its “cataclysmic effect” 
outside the area of patent law and suggesting that, “[i]n deciding whether to issue injunctions, courts 
would generally do well by continuing to use the kinds of structured sets of presumptions and safety 
valves that have characterized traditional equitable practice”). 
23 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s policing of rule-based adjudication in the 
context of patent law).  
24 See Rai, supra note 16, at 1115–22 (discussing the limits of formalism). 
25 See Gugliuzza, supra note 10, at 1441 (arguing for reconsideration of the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction based on the assumption that “patent law’s problems can be traced in significant part to the 
Federal Circuit”). 
26 See Nard & Duffy, supra note 9, at 1625 (suggesting that at least one extant circuit court should 
be empowered to hear patent appeals).  But see generally S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1735 (2007) (criticizing Professor Nard and Professor Duffy’s suggestion).  
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law governing patents.27  Some have gone so far as to suggest or, at least 
question, whether the Federal Circuit should be abolished.28  What has 
remained relatively unexplored is why the Federal Circuit has continued to 
favor rules—that is, the normative basis to favor rules in patent cases—and 
whether the court should continue at least to consider the appropriateness 
of rule-based adjudication in patent cases under the present institutional 
structure. 
This Article explores the issue of the proper institutional roles of the 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court through the lens of general conceptions 
of advantages and disadvantages associated with rule-based adjudication 
on the one hand, and standard-based adjudication on the other hand.29  
Through this lens, this Article studies how the Supreme Court’s 
supervision of the development of patent law has changed over time, and 
how the Supreme Court should exercise its supervisory powers in the 
future.  In short, this Article evaluates the responsibility of the Supreme 
Court in policing the Federal Circuit’s apparent preference for rule-based 
adjudication, assesses normative bases for rule-based adjudication in patent 
law, and suggests a framework for the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
to evaluate the appropriate degree of rule-based adjudication in patent law 
given the courts’ unique abilities and roles. 
This Article reaches several fundamental conclusions.  First, contrary 
to the theme of the modern critique of the Federal Circuit, the court is 
performing its intended role when it considers the usefulness of rules to 
govern issues in patent law.  Second, it is the Supreme Court’s role to 
police the Federal Circuit’s understandable preference for rule-based 
adjudication, and any excessive use of inflexible rules in patent law is at 
least in part reflective of the Supreme Court’s failure to engage in this 
policing role.  Thus, it is important to consider how the Supreme Court can 
and should engage in this role moving forward.  Third, given the reasons 
for the creation of the Federal Circuit, as well as other justifications for 
rule-based adjudication in patent law, the Supreme Court should temper its 
own natural and desirable preference for standard-based adjudication when 
                                                                                                                          
27 See Rai, supra note 16, at 1134 (arguing that Congress should give the Patent Office greater 
responsibility); Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 650 (2012) (proposing giving 
the Patent Office substantive rule-making authority).  
28 See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 10, at 1496 (“One possibility is that, after cutting over half of 
the Federal Circuit’s docket, we simply finish the job by abolishing the court altogether.”). 
29 In this Article, I analyze the battle between rules and standards in patent law adjudication—
which may be viewed as a “localized battle” in the larger conflict between formalist and antiformalist 
schools of jurisprudence.  Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of 
Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195, 224 (2009).  Elsewhere I consider another “localized battle” in the 
larger conflict—the debate over the primacy of precedent and policy in patent law adjudication.  See 
generally David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Precedent and 
Policy, 66 SMU L. REV. 633 (2013) (examining the importance of the Federal Circuit and its judges 
engaging in ongoing policy debate regarding patent law doctrines). 
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reviewing the decisions of the Federal Circuit.  In short, the Federal 
Circuit’s consideration of rule-based adjudication reflects not only the 
expected but also the preferred practice of a semi-specialized intermediate 
appellate court whose stewardship of patent law is subject to discretionary 
review by a generalized court of last resort. 
This Article is organized into five parts following this introduction.  
Part II considers general conceptions of formalism and antiformalism, with 
particular attention given to the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with rule-based adjudication and standard-based adjudication.  Part III 
studies the Federal Circuit’s tendency to embrace rule-based adjudication.  
Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s history of oversight of the Federal 
Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s reputation for 
rejecting rule-based adjudication in favor of standard-based adjudication.  
Part V evaluates the respective institutional roles of the Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court in the development of patent law, given the current 
institutional structure and the normative bases for rule-based adjudication 
in patent law.  Finally, Part VI includes some brief concluding remarks. 
II.  LEGAL FORMS 
General conceptions of formalism and antiformalism provide a lens 
through which to study the respective roles of the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court within the modern patent system.  This Part considers these 
general conceptions, with particular attention given to the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with rule-based adjudication on the one hand and 
standard-based adjudication on the other hand. 
A.  Formalism and Antiformalism Generally 
Scholars have long analyzed and debated legal form separate and apart 
from legal substance.30  With respect to the form of the law, they contrast 
formalism on one end of the spectrum with antiformalism on the other end 
of the spectrum.  Classic formalism embraces the view that the law is a 
scientific system in which legal institutions use rules to dictate correct 
                                                                                                                          
30 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 25 (1997) (stating that the “[t]he rule of law is about form” and that textualism is “of course 
formalistic!”); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 29 (1967) (describing 
“legal principles as separate sorts of standards, different from legal rules” in his analysis); Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–68 (1992) (offering 
an “economic analysis of the extent to which legal commands should be promulgated as rules or 
standards” and recognizing that “definition of rules and standards commonly emphasize the distinction 
between whether the law is given context ex ante or ex post”); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance 
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685–94 (1976) (describing the “formally 
realizable rule” as the “opposite pole” from a “standard or principle or policy”); Pierre Schlag, Rules 
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379–81 (1985) (illustrating distinctions between rules and 
standards). 
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outcomes in all cases.31  As a branch or particular application of formalism, 
adjudicative rule-formalism is the view that judges should construe 
positive legal norms as rules such that their future application will be 
“mechanical and uncontroversial.”32   
Antiformalism, by contrast, maintains that law is a “means to an end,” 
where resolution of legal questions turns on views of policies and 
anticipated effects.33  Indeed, antiformalism insists that the resolution of 
legal questions requires or at least permits resort to sources other than the 
text of a rule.34  “Antiformalist doctrine thus is ‘realist’ to the extent that it 
responds to the real-world technical, institutional, and economic context in 
which [the] law unfolds.”35  Antiformalism therefore focuses on outcomes 
and policy objectives while remaining attentive to facts and context.36  To 
this end, the antiformalist will look beyond traditional legal authorities and 
consult empirical and academic studies, or even foreign or international 
law, to shape domestic policies and resolve disputes.37  And while 
adjudicative rule-formalism focuses on the use of rules, adjudication based 
on antiformalism embraces the use of standards.38 
The debate over rules and standards may be viewed as a “localized 
battle” in the larger conflict between formalist and antiformalist schools of 
jurisprudence.39  Indeed, rules and standards represent polar opposite 
approaches to resolving legal questions.  This rules-standards dichotomy 
may be illustrated by contrasting a law that imposes a fine on a driver who 
exceeds a speed limit, with a law that imposes a fine on a driver who drives 
at an “excessive speed.”40  The speed limit, of course, represents the legal 
rule, while the prohibition on “excessive speed” represents the legal 
standard.  In addition to this simple pedagogical example, most law 
                                                                                                                          
31 See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (1999) (“To the 
classical formalists, law meant more: it meant a scientific system of rules and institutions that were 
complete in that the system made right answers available in all cases.”); see also Tun-Jen Chiang, 
Formalism, Realism, and Patent Scope, 1 IP THEORY 88, 90 (2010) (“Stated generally, [classic] 
formalism is the philosophy that law is a self-contained discipline, and that there is always one ‘correct’ 
answer to legal problems that can be reached using the internal tools of the discipline, primarily logic, 
precedent, and rules.”). 
32 Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 
936 (1999). 
33 Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New Formalism 
(With Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 19–20 (2001). 
34 Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 639 
(1999). 
35 Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit, supra note 16, at 411. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 411–12. 
38 See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1688 (“At the opposite pole from a formally realizable rule is a 
standard or principle or policy.”). 
39 Schlag, supra note 29, at 224.   
40 Kaplow, supra note 30, at 560. 
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students become well acquainted with the two legal forms in their first year 
of law school.  Classic examples of rules include property law’s rule 
against perpetuities and contract law’s statute of frauds, while classic 
examples of standards include tort law’s reasonable person standard and 
contract law’s unconscionability standard.  It is helpful to think of a rule as 
any imperative that is capable of determination ex ante (before the event in 
question) and a standard as any imperative that must be assessed ex post 
(after the event).41  Thus, a speed limit is classifiable as a rule because a 
driver can determine with reasonable certainty where the line of illegal 
activity is in advance of driving.  Tort law’s reasonable person standard is 
classifiable as a standard because a party cannot be certain whether he or 
she has acted reasonably until after the events have transpired and a court 
or jury has weighed the available, admissible evidence regarding the 
circumstances and reached a conclusion. 
Yet, the classification of a legal principle as a rule or a standard is not 
always straightforward or even possible.42  In practice, a legal principle 
that, on its face, appears to be a bright-line rule may, in fact, contain a 
hidden standard.43  Indeed, vagueness of one or more terms in an otherwise 
unequivocal statement can cause an ex ante rule to unravel into an ex post 
standard. 
As an example from patent law, consider the on-sale bar presently 
expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) and (b)(1), which with certain 
exceptions bars a patent for any claimed invention that was on sale before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention.44  This appears to be a 
bright-line rule.  But what does it mean for an “invention” to be “on sale”?  
If an idea has not been incorporated into something that is built and tested, 
for example, can it nevertheless be the subject of an offer for sale?  For the 
                                                                                                                          
41 See id. at 559–60 (leading a law and economics analysis by first acknowledging the common 
conception that rules can be distinguished from standards based on whether an ex ante or ex post legal 
determination is possible); cf. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974) (defining the difference between a rule and a standard 
as a function of precision); Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1687–88 (describing the quality of “ruleness” as 
a matter of degree on a continuum of formal realizability). 
42 It is not always clear on the continuum of formal realizability where a rule ends and a standard 
begins.  See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1689 (“The dimensions of generality and formal realizability 
are logically independent: we can have general or particular standards, and general or particular rules.  
But there are relationships between the dimensions that commonly emerge in practice.”).  Indeed, 
Professor Sunstein has suggested abandoning attempts at categorization and, instead, inquiring as to the 
degree of formalism that is present and appropriate.  See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 640 (“The real 
question is ‘what degree of formalism?’”).  I adopt this convention below. 
43 Professor Isaac Ehrlich and Judge Richard Posner would describe such a rule as relatively 
imprecise.  See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41, at 258 (“The difference between a rule and a standard 
is a matter of degreea degree of precision.”). 
44 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp. V 2011).  For descriptions of this example, see Craig Allen 
Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 80–83 (2010), and Thomas, 
supra note 16, at 778–81. 
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better part of two decades, the Federal Circuit applied a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach to determining whether an invention had been 
placed on sale in such a situation.45  Inventors, however, faced difficult 
challenges determining ex ante whether in particular circumstances they 
would be barred from obtaining patents on their inventions.46  Difficulty in 
applying a standard often encourages courts to develop assistive rules that 
cut short the need for a deeper, more fact-intensive inquiry.  Thus, out of 
concern that the Federal Circuit’s holistic approach produced too much 
uncertainty, the Supreme Court eventually replaced the Federal Circuit’s 
totality-of-the-circumstances test with its own, more rule-like, two-part test 
in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics.47  Such morphing of legal form has led some 
scholars to make the general observation that, in time, standards may 
crystallize into rules and rules may dissolve into standards.48 
B.   Advantages and Disadvantages Associated with Rule-Based 
Adjudication and Standard-Based Adjudication 
The potential of legislatures and courts to articulate a rule or a standard 
to govern any particular legal issue raises a basic, but important, question.  
Is one legal form demonstrably superior to the other?  In the long-running 
debate over rules and standards, scholars have repeatedly made the case for 
one form over the other.  When confronted generally with a choice 
between formalism and antiformalism, however, the debate among 
academics is not close.  The concept of formalism is so disparaged that the 
term formalism itself is considered by some to be an epithet.49  But, in the 
words of Professor Cass Sunstein, “The real question is ‘what degree of 
formalism?’ rather than ‘formalist or not?’”50  And to answer this “real 
                                                                                                                          
45 See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(requiring consideration of all circumstances surrounding the relevant event and weighing of these 
circumstances against policies underlying the on-sale bar). 
46 Thomas, supra note 16, at 778–79. 
47 Id. at 780.  The test announced by the Supreme Court requires (1) a product to be “the subject 
of a commercial offer for sale” and (2) “the invention must be ready for patenting.”  Pfaff v. Wells 
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).  Notably, after highlighting that the Federal Circuit itself had 
admitted that its totality-of-the-circumstances test had been criticized as “unnecessarily vague,” id. at 
66 n.11, the Supreme Court explained that its new test would not create “unmanageable uncertainty,” 
id. at 67. 
48 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 604 (1988) 
(observing a “cyclical pattern” in property law); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules 
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 96–97 (1992) (arguing that “the political valences of rules and 
standards shift in cycles over time” as the complementary adjudicative form is chosen to countervail 
the prevailing political position).  
49 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 32, at 934 (indicating that the label “formalist” is “never a 
term of endearment, to my ear”); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511 (1988) 
(conceding “contemporary aversion to formalism” and advocating for “inspection, rather than . . . a 
discourse of epithets”). 
50 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 640. 
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question,” it is important to consider the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with rule-based adjudication and standard-based adjudication. 
For proponents of rules, rules are fairer.  Rules promote fairness 
through consistency of outcome and equality of treatment under the law.51  
Rules provide determinate answers to legal questions, which allow for 
predictability that fosters efficient private ordering and investment.52  
Besides predictability, rules may decrease the possibility of error.53  
Indeed, by definition rules cabin judicial discretion54 and, therefore, may 
“restrict misguided, incompetent, wicked, power-hungry, or simply 
mistaken decisionmakers.”55  Rules encourage impartiality by requiring 
judges to ignore non-dispositive facts that may lead to bias or favoritism.56  
Rules likewise foster conformity because participants are encouraged to 
learn the law to avoid violation of it.57  As Professor Duncan Kennedy put 
it, “People will miss fewer trains . . . if they know the engineer will leave 
without them rather than delay even a few seconds.”58  Rules written by 
legislative bodies may serve as a device to allocate decision-making 
authority between Congress and the courts or between courts and an 
administrative body.59  Rules developed as part of the common law may 
similarly allocate decision-making authority between courts and an 
administrative body as well as between appellate and trial judges.  Given 
the technical nature of disputes arising in patent law, rules can also be seen 
as decreasing the “cognitive burden” on generalist judges by providing 
them with shortcuts and rules of thumb that curtail deeper inquiry that 
requires familiarity not just with patent law, but also with the particular 
science or engineering field of the patent in question.60  And for thousands 
of patent examiners at the Patent Office, many of whom may not even be 
attorneys, rules may foster uniformity of application and eliminate 
discretion leading to arbitrary determinations of patentability. 
There are, however, common criticisms of rules.  “Rules cost more to 
                                                                                                                          
51 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989).  
Justice Scalia argues that fairness through equality of treatment under the law is more essential to 
justice than fairness of a particular result.  Id.  Indeed, Justice Scalia is an ardent supporter of formalism 
based on its ability to constrict the discretion of governmental actors.  See SCALIA, supra note 30, at 25 
(“Long live formalism.  It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of men.”). 
52 Nard, supra note 44, at 79–81.  In Justice Scalia’s view, while it may not always be possible to 
reach a determinate outcome via rules, rules (as opposed to standards) are more likely to keep a judge’s 
pen within the margins of what the law will tolerate.  Scalia, supra note 51, at 1186.   
53 Schauer, supra note 49, at 539–42. 
54 Chiang, supra note 31, at 91; Nard, supra note 44, at 87. 
55 Schauer, supra note 49, at 543. 
56 Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 974–75 (1995). 
57 Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1697–98. 
58 Id. at 1698. 
59 Nard, supra note 44, at 89–90. 
60 Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 25–27. 
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promulgate” because proper design demands more information earlier in 
the design process and more time spent enumerating inclusions and 
exceptions.61  Even when rules are well crafted, rules are often over- or 
under-inclusive, leaving a gap between the law’s purpose and its actual 
effect.62  Such gaps allow wrongdoers to evade the spirit of a rule by 
“engaging in conduct that is technically exempted but that creates the same 
or analogous harms.”63  “Rules are often shown to be perverse through new 
developments,” requiring additional expense to keep them contemporary.64  
Furthermore, if one purpose of rules is to cabin discretion, this purpose is 
frequently frustrated.  Rules often require a decision-maker to apply 
significant discretion in deciding which rule applies to a particular 
situation.65  The transparency of discretion may be transferred to opaque 
entities and driven underground in the form of civil disobedience, non-
enforcement, or nullification in response to perceived injustice resulting 
from the uniform application of a rule.66 
On the other hand, proponents of standards tout standards as the fairer 
legal form.  Standards permit fairness of outcome by tailoring the law to 
the facts of each case.  Standards are thus attentive to the whole situation 
and to the particulars.67  Standards also permit flexibility in the legal 
system by allowing decision-makers to adapt to changing circumstances.68  
Standards promote accountability regarding the outcome of legal disputes.  
In particular, unlike rules, which allow a decision-maker to shield himself 
or herself from criticism with the excuse that he or she was merely 
following the letter of the applicable rule, standards require a decision-
maker to take responsibility for decisions and to provide “a particularized, 
rational account of how” he or she arrives at those decisions.69  
Consequently, standards also promote transparency and candor, “allowing 
                                                                                                                          
61 Kaplow, supra note 30, at 577. 
62 See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 992 (suggesting that rules are very hard to design well because 
people often lack enough information to craft rules that will produce sufficiently accurate results). 
63 Id. at 995. 
64 Id. at 993.  Designers of rules cannot know the full range of situations to which the rule will be 
applied.  For example, Professor Sunstein observed that the rise of cable television in the 1980s and 
1990s revealed a regulatory framework designed for three television networks built on “wildly false 
assumptions.”  Id.  In the field of patent law, this has been argued to be true especially with regard to 
defining patent-eligible subject matter.  See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of 
Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 614 (2009) (arguing that rules defining patent eligibility 
always fail in the long run because the innovation that spurs changing circumstances renders existing 
rules obsolete). 
65 Sunstein, supra note 56, at 979–80, 985. 
66 See id. at 995 (noting how a rule-like, severe sanction for the Clean Air Act’s listed pollutants 
led the Environmental Protection Agency to stop listing the pollutants). 
67 See id. at 999–1000 (arguing that a system of factors “tends to look closely at a wide range of 
particulars”).  
68 Nard, supra note 45, at 92. 
69 Id. at 97. 
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outsiders to debate the merits and persuasiveness of unelected officials’ 
work product.”70  In the realm of patents and intellectual property law, a 
standard-based approach tailored to particular technologies might also 
reduce the costs created by uniform, rule-like grants of intellectual 
property rights.71 
As with rules, however, there are common criticisms of standards.  
With standards, there is difficulty in describing relevant factors ex ante.72  
Similarly, there is no a priori sense of the appropriate weight of criteria.73  
The uncertain nature of standards ex ante requires participants to invest 
more heavily in legal advice in order to help mitigate risk stemming from 
uncertainty.74  Standards also cost more to enforce and litigate.  Standards 
increase the amount of time it takes to dispose of disputes, increasing the 
likelihood of error as evidence decays over time.75  Moreover, standards 
invite judges to make findings of fact instead of findings of law, thus 
invading the natural province of the jury.76 
In light of these advantages and disadvantages associated with rules 
and standards, at least one scholar has reached the conclusion that the 
rules-standards dichotomy has become an irreducible dialectic.77  From this 
perspective, one can summarize many of the touted benefits and criticisms 
of the two forms using a table of contrasting pros and cons.78  The pros and 
cons reduce to nothing more than scripted lines in a ritualized dialogue 
about rules and standards79: “We should adopt a rule because it would be 
more determinate.”  “No, a rule would be too mechanical.  We should 
adopt a standard, which allows flexibility.”  “But, standards aren’t 
flexible; they are merely vague.” 
                                                                                                                          
70 Id. at 98. 
71 See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property 
Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 853, 892–93 (2006) (discussing the problem of intellectual property 
protection schemes designed for industries that require high levels of protection, thus raising the costs 
of entry for all market participants regardless of whether such protection is warranted).  Whether total 
cost would be reduced, however, depends upon increased decision-making costs associated with a 
standard-based scheme. 
72 Sunstein, supra note 56, at 998–99. 
73 Id. at 999. 
74 Kaplow, supra note 30, at 569. 
75 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41, at 266. 
76 Scalia, supra note 51, at 1180–81. 
77 Schlag, supra note 29, at 226; see also Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1710 (“The different values 
that people commonly associate with the formal modes of rule and standard are conveyed by the 
emotive or judgmental words that the advocates of the two positions use in the course of debate about a 
particular issue.”). 
78 Schlag, supra note 29, at 226. 
79 See id. (charting common patterns in such conversations).  
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III.  FORMALISM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
Over the past decade, scholars have revived the classic debate over 
legal form, but in the context of patent law.  The questions they address are 
generally bipolar: whether patent law should be promulgated as bright-line 
rules or flexible standards, and whether the Federal Circuit is in fact 
promulgating bright-line rules or flexible standards.  These scholars 
generally favor standards—at least compared to the degree to which the 
Federal Circuit has favored rules—and many have dubbed the Federal 
Circuit as formalist based on the degree to which it appears to favor rules 
over standards.  In short, critics routinely suggest that the Federal Circuit 
improperly enforces rule-based adjudication.  This Part studies the Federal 
Circuit’s reputation for embracing rule-based adjudication in patent cases 
and scholars’ criticisms of its approach. 
A.  The Reputation of the Federal Circuit 
Before considering recent critiques of the Federal Circuit’s use of 
rules, it is important to recognize that shortly after its formation at least one 
prominent scholar praised the Federal Circuit for its success in bringing 
greater predictability to patent law, which at least in part was attributed to 
its adoption of various rule-like tests. 
1.  An Early Assessment 
Almost since the Federal Circuit’s inception, Professor Rochelle 
Dreyfuss has studied the court and its development of patent law.  Five 
years after the formation of the court, she authored a seminal article 
analyzing the Federal Circuit’s efforts to make patent law more precise and 
accurate.80  In the course of her analysis of precision and accuracy, 
Professor Dreyfuss commented on the court’s successful use of rules as 
legal tests to define patent law.81 
With respect to precision, Professor Dreyfuss explained that “[t]he best 
measure of precision would be to see whether two courts deciding the same 
case reach the same result.”82  She recognized that proponents of the 
formation of the Federal Circuit thought improving patent law’s precision 
“would foster technological growth and industrial innovation and would 
facilitate business planning.”83  Having studied the Federal Circuit’s cases, 
she concluded that, at that time, the court had “made strides” in the 
                                                                                                                          
80 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).    
81 See id. at 8, 10–11 (describing the court’s successes in clarifying patent law doctrines using 
rules). 
82 Id. at 8. 
83 Id. at 7. 
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direction of making patent law precise.84  In particular, she highlighted the 
success of the court’s use of rules to make patentability determinations 
more precise—using decisions regarding obviousness as her primary 
example.85  In this regard she noted that “[b]right line rules, objective 
criteria, and minimal exceptions may not make for accurate adjudication 
(the ‘right’ result in every case), but they create a body of law that is easier 
to apply uniformly and to predict with certainty.”86  On the other hand, she 
indicated that the Federal Circuit had not done as well clarifying issues that 
mainly arise in enforcement proceedings, like the law on monetary 
damages.87 
Professor Dreyfuss explained that by “accuracy” she referred to the 
actual correctness of the results of cases.88  She measured the Federal 
Circuit’s success striving for accuracy by “evaluat[ing] the extent to which 
the court has formulated rules that reflect sensitivity to the needs of the 
technology industry” and “the degree to which the court has attempted to 
advance what it regards as national policy.”89  In both senses of accuracy, 
she ultimately provided examples of ways in which the court had 
attempted to make patent law more accurate.90  She concluded that the 
Federal Circuit’s “jurisprudence reveals that the court has begun to make 
patent law more accurate, precise, and coherent,”91 and that the court was 
“moving in the right direction.”92 
Professor Dreyfuss has expounded upon her view that the quality of 
decision making by the Federal Circuit should be analyzed, at least in part, 
based on accuracy and precision.93  With respect to precision, “the law 
must be perceived as stable and predictable so that people can conform 
their behavior to it” and so that “parties can predict the outcome of 
disputes themselves, [and therefore] resort less frequently to judicial 
intervention.”94  As to the relative importance of accuracy and precision, 
she appears to have come down on the side of precision, indicating that 
                                                                                                                          
84 Id. at 8. 
85 Id. at 8–10. 
86 Id. at 8. 
87 See id. at 11–12 (explaining that the Federal Circuit has not clarified the law governing 
monetary damages for patent infringement). 
88 Id. at 14. 
89 Id. 
90 See id. at 14–20 (highlighting various Federal Circuit tests as examples of the court’s efforts to 
make patent law more accurate). 
91 Id. at 24. 
92 Id. at 64.   
93 See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving 
Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995) (stating the importance of accuracy and precision).   
94 Id. at 12–13.   
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precision is “more important in some respects.”95  As she notes, “To 
achieve precision, however, courts must sometimes sacrifice accuracy to 
ease of application.”96 
2.  More Recent Assessments 
In later assessments of the Federal Circuit’s performance by Professor 
Dreyfuss as well as other academics, the Federal Circuit and the goal of 
precision or predictability have not fared so well.  Indeed, in the last ten 
years academics have repeatedly chastised the Federal Circuit for overuse 
of rule-based adjudication. 
Nearly simultaneously in 2003, shortly after the Supreme Court 
rejected as too “rigid” a rule developed by the Federal Circuit to provide 
certainty with respect to the doctrine of equivalents,97 Professors Arti Rai 
and John Thomas each commented on the tendency of the Federal Circuit 
to engage in formalistic rule-based adjudication.98  Professor Rai 
recognized that the Federal Circuit seemed to have pursued two anomalous 
strategies, vigorous de novo review of questions of fact and application of 
formalist, bright-line rules that leave little room for factual inquiry.99  She 
argued that Congress made a mistake in institutional design when it 
implemented patent reform by focusing on the appellate level.100  In 
particular, she identified two deficiencies in the institutional design after 
the formation of the Federal Circuit: (1) no institution in the patent system 
has expertise necessary to conduct accurate fact-finding, and (2) “no 
institution has taken responsibility for elaborating patent law in the fact-
specific, policy-oriented manner that the language of the [patent] statute 
encourages.”101 
In her scholarship, Professor Rai addressed the normative question 
whether patent law should be promulgated as bright-line rules or flexible 
standards,102 but did so based on the assumption that the adoption of 
                                                                                                                          
95 See id. at 13 (“Thus, while it is desirable for courts to reach the right (accurate) result in every 
case, reaching reproducible results across the array of cases a court hears is more important in some 
respects.”). 
96 Id. 
97 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) 
(indicating that “the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources 
but is not necessarily the most efficient rule”); id. at 738 (rejecting the complete bar to the doctrine of 
equivalents and noting that “we have consistently applied the doctrine [of equivalents] in a flexible 
way, not a rigid one”). 
98 See Rai, supra note 16, at 1037–41 (critiquing the Federal Circuit’s reliance on rule-based 
adjudication and advocating for multi-institutional patent reform); Thomas, supra note 16, at 772–75 
(providing examples of a shift at the Federal Circuit towards rule-based formalism).  
99 Rai, supra note 16, at 1037. 
100 Id. at 1040. 
101 Id. at 1040–41. 
102 See id. at 1074 (asserting that substituting bright-line rules for fact-specific standards is unwise 
as a normative matter). 
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bright-line rules would not be based on policy considerations.103  Indeed, 
while she admitted that “formalism is of course eminently defensible as a 
normative matter,”104 she argued that “rule-formalism that is opaque to 
policy considerations . . . is [nonetheless] a poor fit for [the] patent 
statute.”105  Her position was largely based on the nature of the patent 
statute, which in her view suggests that Congress “wanted the courts to 
engage in relatively wide-ranging interpretation of [its] provisions.”106 
Importantly for purposes of this Article, Professor Rai criticized two 
arguments in favor of bright-line rules.  She rejected the argument that 
formalism necessarily reduces decision-making costs, because, depending 
on the rule adopted, the result may be expensive, such as an overly-
permissive rule regarding patent eligibility that results in a “flood of patent 
applications that will clog the Patent and Trademark Office and court 
system for years.”107  She also recognized that while “bright-line rules may 
increase predictability for future cases, they can upset expectations quite 
dramatically when they are first enunciated.”108  Based on these and related 
arguments, she concluded that rule-based adjudication without 
consideration of policy in the arena of patent law is inappropriate.109  And 
while she contended that formalism is a poor fit for the patent statute, 
Professor Rai concluded that “the Federal Circuit’s approach to decision-
making has been decidedly formalist.”110  Indeed, in her view, “there can 
be no serious dispute that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is formalist in 
its orientation.”111  
Professor Thomas also addressed the Federal Circuit’s bent toward 
rule-based adjudication in scholarship published the same year as Professor 
Rai’s article.112  In his scholarship, Professor Thomas suggested that there 
is a common theme in the Federal Circuit’s decision making, and that is a 
movement toward rules rather than standards.113  He pointed out that, in the 
beginning, the mission of the Federal Circuit was to eliminate 
inconsistencies in patent law, but after succeeding on that front the court’s 
mission became certainty and predictability.114  He explained the court’s 
preference for rule-based adjudicative formalism based on the legislative 
                                                                                                                          
103 Id. at 1101–02. 
104 Id. at 1115. 
105 Id. at 1102 (emphasis added). 
106 Id. at 1116. 
107 Id. at 1121. 
108 Id. at 1174–75. 
109 Id. at 1102. 
110 Id. at 1103–04. 
111 Id. at 1115. 
112 See generally Thomas, supra note 16 (cautioning that the Federal Circuit must consider other 
priorities in addition to certainty and predictability).  
113 Id. at 792. 
114 Id. at 794. 
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history surrounding the court’s formation, the preference of the patent bar, 
the desire to simplify complex law, and the goal of providing the Patent 
Office with easily-administrable rules.115  As a normative matter, however, 
he cautioned against rule-based formalism in patent law.116 
Around the same time, Professor Dreyfuss similarly criticized the 
Federal Circuit for formalistic citations to precedent and debate over how 
to construe language in that precedent to the exclusion of consideration of 
extra-judicial materials including legal and economic scholarship.117  In the 
process, she noted her belief that, while “formalism creates bright line 
rules that are easy for lower courts to apply,” the Federal Circuit’s 
formalism—construing language in precedent “to the exclusion of policy 
considerations”—does not make it easy for lower courts to apply the 
law.118 
Professor Dreyfuss addressed the Federal Circuit’s tilt toward rule-
based adjudication in more detail a few years later.  After reasserting her 
earlier conclusion that the Federal Circuit had continued to make patent 
law “more determinate in that it is easier to predict outcomes,”119 she noted 
that “[n]onetheless, observers of the patent system have voiced 
increasingly vociferous complaints about the state of patent jurisprudence, 
and by extension about the Federal Circuit.”120  According to Professor 
Dreyfuss, “[T]he Supreme Court’s unprecedented activity in the patent 
arena indicates that it too is concerned about the Federal Circuit’s 
performance.”121  The problem, as she sees it, is that—even if precision is 
more important than accuracy in some respects—the Federal Circuit’s 
patent law too often favors precision to the detriment of accuracy.  She 
explains that “[t]he Supreme Court’s reversals and vacatur of Federal 
Circuit opinions can be taken as striking a different balance between 
precision and accuracy.”122  In short, the Federal Circuit favors precision 
                                                                                                                          
115 Id. at 794–96. 
116 Id. at 796–810. 
117 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 780–83 (2004). 
118 Id. at 778 n.33 (emphasis added). 
119 Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 789.  In particular, she cited studies showing that doctrinal 
developments made the law of non-obviousness “quite predictable,” id. at 793 (citing Petherbridge & 
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infringement, validity, and inequitable conduct, declined,” id. (citing Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure 
of Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025 
(2007)), that claim construction is as determinate as contract interpretation in other circuits, id. at 793–
94 (same), and that more generally “the judges of the Federal Circuit have, in large part, coalesced 
around particular interpretations of patentability law and display few ideological differences,” id. at 794 
(citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 
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120 Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 789. 
121 Id. at 791. 
122 Id. at 798. 
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and predictability, which may be achieved more often using rules, while 
the Supreme Court favors accuracy and therefore more standard-based 
approaches.123  And Professor Dreyfuss appears to side with the Supreme 
Court in terms of the right balance.  In her view, the Federal Circuit has not 
found the right balance between precision and accuracy and therefore 
between rules and standards.124 
As to finding the right balance, she has emphasized the tension 
between predictability and accuracy, “the effort to produce predictable law 
[and] the goal of generating law that accurately responds to national needs 
and policies.”125  As an example of an area in which the Federal Circuit has 
not found the right balance between predictability and accuracy, and where 
indeed the court’s efforts to use bright lines rules to enhance predictability 
have had negative consequences, Professor Dreyfuss pointed to 
patentability.126  In her words: “When bright-line rules drive the standard 
of patentability so low that economists, the Federal Trade Commission, 
and the National Academies become concerned about impenetrable patent 
thickets, it is time to reconsider the tradeoffs the court has made, even 
while acknowledging that it faces a difficult task.”127 
She concluded that the Supreme Court’s many decisions reversing and 
remanding cases decided by the Federal Circuit—not just on issues related 
to patentability—reflect a rethinking of the proper balance between 
predictability and accuracy, with the Supreme Court giving more emphasis 
to accuracy.128  She highlighted KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.129 as 
an example of a case where the Federal Circuit used a rule to increase 
predictability—the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine 
(“TSM”) test—and the Supreme Court rejected a rigid application of that 
rule in order to achieve the right result.130 
Professors Dreyfuss, Rai, and Thomas are not alone.  Most scholars 
have come to the same conclusion, albeit from different angles.  In short, 
most scholars criticize the Federal Circuit for its perceived penchant for 
rule-based adjudication.  These critics have identified several areas of 
patent law in which the Federal Circuit has adopted rule-based adjudication 
                                                                                                                          
123 See id. at 797–800 (summarizing a series of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions and 
concluding that “the problems with the Federal Circuit appear to be largely related to the question of 
accuracy”). 
124 See id. at 800 (discussing the need of the Federal Circuit to find the correct balance between 
accuracy and precision). 
125 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to Expect, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 835 (2010). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 835–36 (footnote omitted). 
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129 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
130 Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 836. 
 436 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:415 
over standard-based adjudication: subject matter eligibility;131 claim 
construction;132 the written description requirement;133 the non-obviousness 
requirement;134 offer-to-sell type infringement;135 the doctrine of 
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel;136 the common law 
experimental use defense;137 antitrust and patent misuse defenses;138 
permanent injunctions;139 and the entire market value rule.140  In view of 
the vast array of these doctrines, consider Professor Timothy Holbrook’s 
apt summary: “The tendency towards crystal rules at the Federal Circuit 
transcends any particular issues in patent law.”141 
The Federal Circuit, however, has indicated it may be willing to reject 
rigid rules in favor of flexible standards.  A relatively recent en banc 
opinion by the Federal Circuit in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc.,142 for example, cuts against rule-based formalism on the 
issue of indirect infringement.  In the opinion, the Federal Circuit 
addressed the law of joint infringement.143  In prior case law, the Federal 
Circuit had created a bright-line rule—the so-called “single entity rule”—
that one party must perform each and every limitation of a patent claim in 
order to find inducement of infringement.144  The court overruled that prior 
case law, concluding that, for purposes of indirect infringement, multiple 
entities’ actions may be combined to show that each and every limitation 
of a patent claim is performed.145  Significantly, the court based its decision 
                                                                                                                          
131 Rai, supra note 16, at 1103–07; Thomas, supra note 16, at 786–89.  
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shared between two or more actors, doctrinal problems arise”).  
144 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v. 
Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, 
418 F.3d 1282, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that users of an accused system could not infringe 
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145 Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1306. 
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on its view of the relevant policies146: “At the end of the day, we are 
persuaded that Congress did not intend to create a regime in which parties 
could knowingly sidestep infringement liability simply by arranging to 
divide the steps of a method claim between them.”147 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit also relatively recently eliminated a rule 
of thumb that it had repeatedly allowed experts to use as a baseline to 
determine damages in patent cases.148  Previously, “[t]he 25 percent rule of 
thumb ha[d] been used to approximate the reasonable royalty rate that the 
manufacturer of a patented product would be willing to offer to pay to the 
patentee during a hypothetical negotiation.”149  The court rejected use of 
this rule of thumb, concluding that “[e]vidence relying on the 25 percent 
rule of thumb is . . . inadmissible” under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.150 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 “because it 
fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”151  
Thus, the court based rejection of a formalist rule on general legal 
principles governing expert testimony. 
Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s elimination of these bright line rules 
portends a shift in the court’s willingness to regulate its own preference for 
formalistic rule-based adjudication.  Only time will tell.  These cases do 
show, however, that the Federal Circuit may reject rule-based adjudication 
based on its own analysis of policy and general legal principles.   
B.  Critics’ Suggested Changes 
To the extent that scholars have criticized patent law for excessive use 
of rule-based tests, most focus their criticisms on the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions to create or invoke these tests and then propose various changes 
to eliminate or reduce incentives for the Federal Circuit to make these 
decisions.  Professor Rai, for example, made two main, related arguments 
for reform.  First, she argued that the fact-finding ability of both trial courts 
and the Patent Office needed to be improved.152  Second, she argued that 
“primary responsibility for fact finding—and for law application where the 
case turns on factual findings rather than elaboration of the law in a 
manner useful for future cases—should rest with the [Patent Office] and 
                                                                                                                          
146 See id. at 1318 (“While we believe that our interpretation of section 271(b) represents sound 
policy, that does not mean that we have adopted that position as a matter of policy preference. . . . In 
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the trial courts” rather than the Federal Circuit.153  She summarizes her 
thesis nicely: “[T]o the extent that the fact-finding capacity of the inferior 
decisionmakers has been fortified, it is difficult to justify patent formalism 
on the grounds that these decisionmakers need to be tightly controlled.”154 
In Professor Rai’s view, fact-finding by the Federal Circuit is 
inaccurate and inefficient, and rule-based adjudication is inappropriate for 
patent law.155  Therefore, it is not surprising that Professor Rai’s ultimate 
suggestions are to improve the fact-finding capability at trial courts and 
then eliminate rule-based adjudication at the Federal Circuit.156  What is 
remarkable, however, is that several of the specific proposals noted by 
Professor Rai have been adopted.  Indeed, the fact-finding ability of both 
trial courts and the Patent Office have improved quite dramatically since 
2003.   
With respect to the suggestion of improving fact-finding by trial 
courts, Congress and President Obama enacted a new law “to encourage 
enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district judges.”157  This 
program, the so-called “Patent Pilot Program,” allows judges in certain 
district courts to take a disproportionate share of the patent cases filed in 
their districts.158  Since these judges can semi-specialize in patent law, the 
hope is that there will be a reduction in the rate of reversals by the Federal 
Circuit based on claim construction and other patent law issues without 
negatively impacting the time between filing and trial or summary 
judgment.  Time will tell whether this program increases the confidence of 
the Federal Circuit in the ability of district courts to engage in complex 
fact-finding and to apply complex patent law, which could result in 
reduced rule-based adjudication. 
With respect to the suggestion of improving fact-finding at the Patent 
Office, even more changes have been made.  First, the Patent Office has 
been given authority to set its own fees159 and a reserve fund has been 
established to collect fees in excess of the amount Congress appropriates to 
the Patent Office.160  Moreover, Congress is not allowed to appropriate 
funds from this reserve fund for any purpose other than to fund Patent 
Office activities.161  Second, the Patent Office has been given responsibility 
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to conduct additional post grant proceedings.162  Third, it has been given 
more rulemaking authority.163  Fourth, it has hired a Chief Economist.164  
Given all of these changes, one similarly wonders whether the Federal 
Circuit will have more confidence in the ability of the Patent Office to 
engage in complex fact-finding and to apply complex patent law, which 
could also result in a reduced need for rule-based adjudication in patent 
law. 
While Professor Rai generally limited her delineation of suggestions to 
ways to improve the fact-finding ability of the Patent Office and trial 
courts, another avenue to improve patent law adjudication is to improve the 
Federal Circuit’s ability to set policy in the form of the rules and standards 
it adopts to govern important issues in patent law.  One might argue that 
courts are not the right institution to set policy.  There are good reasons 
supporting this argument, including the institutional limitations and ad hoc 
nature of litigation.  However, as Professor Rai concedes, given the patent 
statute, Congress appears to have delegated at least some policy-making 
power to the court system.165  Thus, another response to criticism of the 
Federal Circuit’s adoption of rules in various circumstances is to improve 
the ability of the Federal Circuit to determine when rule-based adjudication 
is appropriate, and to improve the quality of any rules it creates.  Yet 
another response, as this Article suggests, is to focus on the role of the 
Supreme Court to police excess rule-based adjudication at the Federal 
Circuit. 
Professor Thomas’s analysis provided fewer suggestions for change 
than it did suggestions for caution based on the “potentially unattractive 
consequences of . . . adjudicative rule formalism.”166  He highlighted 
dangers associated with the imposition of rules to govern all of the 
innovation industry when “it may be desirable to tailor patent doctrine to 
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the ever-changing conditions of different industries.”167  He raiseed the 
possibility that the Federal Circuit’s rules may actually increase the 
burdens on the Patent Office, “both in terms of enlarging the number of 
applications filed and the costs of the administrative process itself.”168  And 
he questioned “whether adjudicative rule formalism will achieve its goals 
of certainty, predictability, and doctrinal stability” given the Federal 
Circuit’s own difficulty following the rules it has created and sustained.169  
He ultimately concluded that “sound innovation policy and due regard for 
administrative ramifications, along with a healthy skepticism over whether 
certainty can be practically achieved, suggests the desirability of more 
nuanced alternatives” to rule-based adjudication.170 
Professor Dreyfuss, for her part, has suggested a myriad of reforms “to 
avoid the need for rules that produce precision but reduce accuracy and 
quality.”171  For the moment, I focus on her suggested reforms that do not 
relate to the Supreme Court’s oversight of the Federal Circuit.  In this 
context, she considers and rejects the ideas of removing exclusive 
jurisdiction from the Federal Circuit, placing “‘entrepreneurial judges’ who 
excel at developing new rules” on the Federal Circuit, and giving the 
Patent Office substantive rule-making authority.172  She supports the 
appointment of better judges to the Federal Circuit.173  But she also 
advocates attracting “more academically oriented, as opposed to 
practitioner-oriented, law clerks,” encouraging Federal Circuit judges to 
visit other courts and judges from other courts to visit the Federal Circuit 
to improve its culture, and having new Federal Circuit judges attend an 
orientation program to foster new norms at the Federal Circuit.174 
As shown, these scholars have proposed various reforms to reduce the 
Federal Circuit’s apparent penchant for rule-based adjudication in patent 
law.  However, few scholars—besides Professor Dreyfuss, as we shall 
see—focus on the Supreme Court and its responsibility for policing the 
Federal Circuit.  I turn to that subject next. 
IV.  ANTIFORMALISM AT THE SUPREME COURT 
A robust study of formalism by the Federal Circuit must consider the 
role of the Supreme Court given its status as the nation’s court of last 
resort.  While the Federal Circuit has a reputation as a formalist court 
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based on its preference for rules, the Supreme Court has a reputation as an 
antiformalist alternative by overturning the Federal Circuit on a number of 
key issues in patent law and, in particular, replacing the Federal Circuit’s 
bright-line rules with more open-ended standards.175  As will be seen, some 
scholars have given anecdotal treatment of the Supreme Court’s oversight 
of the Federal Circuit.  This Part, however, studies each patent case in 
which the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Federal Circuit 
and resolved an issue specific to patent law between 1982 and 2012, the 
first three decades of the Federal Circuit’s existence.  This Part thus 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s reputation for standard-based adjudication in 
patent cases and, moreover, its history of policing the Federal Circuit’s 
rule-based adjudication.176 
A.  A Largely Overlooked Area of Study 
There has been surprisingly little academic discourse regarding the role 
of the Supreme Court in policing the Federal Circuit’s perceived penchant 
for rule-based adjudication.  In her scholarship questioning the Federal 
Circuit’s preference for rules over standards, Professor Rai merely 
suggested “sustained,”177 “serious,”178 and “aggressive”179 review by the 
Supreme Court in “patent cases that raise not only allocation of power 
issues but also issues of substantive patent law and policy.”180  In her view, 
“The Supreme Court’s . . . interest in patent law is particularly welcome to 
the extent that at least some Justices on the Court have indicated an explicit 
awareness of the need to discipline the Federal Circuit.”181  In his 
scholarship on the same subject, Professor Thomas did not provide 
normative direction concerning the responsibility of the Supreme Court to 
police the Federal Circuit’s formalism.182 
Professor Dreyfuss, in contrast, has studied the relative roles of the 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court in creating rules and standards in patent 
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law.  In particular, she has compared the advantages of generalist and 
specialized courts handling specialized subject matter in terms of the 
courts’ abilities to make the law governing the specialized subject matter 
more accurate and precise.  For example, she has explained that, “[s]ince 
generalist judges are confronted with the specialty subject matter 
infrequently, they lack the motivation, experience, and time to develop an 
understanding of the law.”183  In particular, “[t]hey decide the occasional 
case based upon a cursory understanding of policy and receive limited 
feedback on how well they fared.”184  By contrast, the “specialized court’s 
sustained involvement with a field would facilitate superior 
decisionmaking” because it “would be in a better position to understand 
when it is appropriate to sacrifice accuracy” for precision and vice versa.185 
Besides considering the theoretical advantage of the more specialized 
court in identifying when standards and accuracy should be sacrificed for 
rules and predictability, Professor Dreyfuss has considered the Supreme 
Court’s role in striking the appropriate balance between precision and 
accuracy in patent law adjudication.  After recognizing that the Federal 
Circuit has emphasized precision through repeated adoptions of rules in 
patent cases, she has noted that the Supreme Court’s reversals and vacaturs 
of Federal Circuit patent cases have struck “a different balance between 
precision and accuracy.”186  She highlights, however, that the Supreme 
Court generally has not paid “enough attention to exert any real influence 
on patent jurisprudence . . . . [and, moreover,] the Court’s failure to 
consider Federal Circuit rulings has fostered reliance interests that 
potentially make revision of Federal Circuit law [adopting rules] more 
difficult to accomplish.”187  Thus, she stresses the need for more attention 
on patent law from the Supreme Court.  She recognizes, however, the 
difficulty the Supreme Court and parties have identifying important cases 
for Supreme Court review given that “the decision to concentrate disputes 
in the Federal Circuit means that the likelihood of circuit splits approaches 
zero.”188  Instead, parties must resort to arguments that Federal Circuit 
decisions conflict with Supreme Court precedent or old regional circuit 
decisions. 
In terms of solutions to these problems with the Supreme Court’s 
oversight, Professor Dreyfuss considers possible changes both to and 
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within the current institutional structure.  As to the role of the Supreme 
Court within the current institutional structure, one reform she suggests 
would be for the Supreme Court to permit the Federal Circuit to reject 
district court factual determinations outside of the requirement of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52 to show clear error.189  For example, she 
recommends that the Supreme Court reconsider Dennison Manufacturing 
Co. v. Panduit Corp. and its application of Rule 52 to the Federal Circuit’s 
oversight of factual determinations of district courts in patent cases.190  
Indeed, she has suggested that the Federal Circuit’s use of rigid rules in 
substantive patent law—and their associated sacrifice of flexibility for 
predictability—results from this application of Rule 52.191  While the 
requirement that appellate courts affirm factual findings made by district 
courts unless they are clearly erroneous makes sense in most 
circumstances, it is less compelling if an appellate court has a better “grasp 
of the facts” compared to the district court.192  And, according to Professor 
Dreyfuss, “the Federal Circuit’s grasp of the facts was clearly better than 
the trial court’s” grasp of the facts in Dennison.193 
Thus, in Professor Dreyfuss’s view, the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Dennison—which fails to address the Federal Circuit’s comparative 
advantage in fact-finding vis-à-vis non-specialized trial courts—is one of 
the root causes of the Federal Circuit’s preference for rules in its oversight 
of the application of patent law by those trial courts.  Consider, however, 
the Federal Circuit’s similar preference for rules in its oversight of the 
application of patent law by the Patent Office.  For example, the TSM rule 
adopted by the Federal Circuit to govern the non-obviousness inquiry 
applied not only to trial courts but also to the Patent Office.194  Compared 
to the Federal Circuit, however, the Patent Office is even more specialized, 
particularly with regard to areas of technology.   
What explains the Federal Circuit’s use of rules given the Patent 
Office’s apparent comparative advantage understanding technology?  One 
might attempt to tell a similar story.  In particular, in Dickinson v. Zurko,195 
the Federal Circuit tried to apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to 
the Patent Office’s decisions, but—like in Dennison—the Supreme Court 
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pushed the court down to a more deferential standard of review, in this 
context the substantial evidence standard.196  The Federal Circuit wished to 
apply a less deferential standard, perhaps because the Federal Circuit 
believes it can just as easily understand technology or perhaps because 
patent examiners have substantially less experience with patent law.197  
The Supreme Court’s rejection of a heightened standard of review in 
Zurko, like in Dennison, theoretically might drive the Federal Circuit to 
rely on more rule-like tests. 
So, really, there are two cases creating standards of review more 
deferential than the Federal Circuit might like.  Perhaps Zurko is more 
appropriate than Dennison, considering that the Patent Office has some 
expertise—particularly more experience with technology compared to the 
trial courts—but it is another instance of the Federal Circuit’s not being 
able to intervene as much as it or others might want given its relative 
experience and expertise (legal and/or technical) compared to the inferior 
decision-makers.  To test the proposition that Zurko may have created a 
reason for the Federal Circuit to favor rules governing the Patent Office, 
however, the relevant time period to analyze is the later time period after 
the Zurko decision,198 and, as an example, the Federal Circuit applied the 
TSM test to the Patent Office long before that later time period.199 
That said, having a semi-specialized appellate court and its potential 
impact on the selection of the appropriate standard of review of factual 
determinations, while not accounted for in Dennison, was expressly 
considered in Zurko.  In particular, the Court rejected the semi-specialized 
nature of the Federal Circuit as a reason for a more invasive standard of 
review of decisions of the Patent Office.  The Federal Circuit’s 
“comparative expertise, by enabling the Circuit better to understand the 
basis for the [Patent Office’s] finding of fact, may play a more important 
role in assuring proper review than would a theoretically somewhat stricter 
standard.”200  In other words, according to the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit’s expertise enabled it to provide better review under the applicable 
standard; it did not justify making the standard less deferential.201  But, 
                                                                                                                          
196 See id. at 152–53 (concluding that the Federal Circuit must review findings of fact made by the 
Patent Office using the standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act rather than the clearly 
erroneous standard). 
197 See Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2013) (lacking a prerequisite for 
patent examiners to have attended law school).  That said, it is less obvious how the relative lack of 
knowledge of the pertinent law would justify a less deferential standard of review regarding fact-
finding. 
198 While the Supreme Court decided Dennison in 1986, it more recently decided Zurko in 1999. 
199 See, e.g., In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1447 (applying the TSM test to the Patent Office in 1992). 
200 Zurko, 527 U.S. at 163. 
201 The Supreme Court also indicated that there does not appear to be any real practical difference 
between a review for clear error and a review for substantial evidence.  Id. at 162–63.  One might not 
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regardless, if Professor Dreyfuss is right about Dennison, then Zurko might 
be another Supreme Court holding that provides at least some motivation 
for the Federal Circuit to resort to more rule-like tests governing fact-
finding—this time by the Patent Office. 
Indeed, according to Professor Dreyfuss, as a result of its obligation to 
apply Rule 52, the Federal Circuit adopted two approaches in its quest to 
create more precise patent law: (1) creating rules (“specific analytical 
techniques”) governing factual questions underlying legal doctrines like 
the non-obviousness requirement; and (2) “classifying many of the more 
complex technical issues as questions of law, rather than issues of fact, so 
that Rule 52 would not bar de novo review.”202  “The Federal Circuit has, 
in short, efficiently canvassed the ways in which it can bring its expertise 
to bear on the facts that affect the outcome of technologically complex 
cases.”203  As Professor Dreyfuss highlights, the Supreme Court has at least 
once approved of the second approach (classifying issues as questions of 
law), but it appears to have real problems with the first approach (creating 
rules).204  According to Professor Dreyfuss, “[T]he Supreme Court is busy 
dismantling the [rules].”205   
Besides suggesting that the Supreme Court change Rule 52 to account 
for the Federal Circuit’s expertise and experience,206 Professor Dreyfuss 
has suggested that the Federal Circuit write “more accurate and better 
reasoned” decisions.207  In this regard, she has criticized the Federal Circuit 
for “fail[ing] to instill confidence in its decisions [creating rule-like tests] 
because it rarely tests the accuracy of its positions by trying to explain 
them” using policy-oriented reasoning.208  She suggests that the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court engage in a dialogue, where the Federal 
Circuit “articulate[s] the theory on which it is relying” and the “policies it 
is adopting.”209  While she is “somewhat skeptical about over-reliance on 
rigid rules,” she does “credit [the Federal Circuit] for taking its role in 
supervising the lower courts seriously” and suggests that the Supreme 
Court consider the importance of creating clear and predictable law.210  
                                                                                                                          
be able to make a similar statement in the context of the standard of review for trial courts’ fact-
finding, depending on what one would use to replace a clear-error standard.  For example, a simple 
error standard compared to a clear-error standard would appear to make a substantial difference.   
202 Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 798. 
203 Id. 
204 Professor Dreyfuss argues that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), to remove claim 
construction from the hands of juries “created more predictability.”  Id. at 791–92, 798. 
205 Id. at 798. 
206 Id. at 799. 
207 Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 814. 
208 Id. at 809. 
209 Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 802. 
210 Id. at 804. 
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But, in the meantime, the Federal Circuit might temper its own preference 
for rules as the means to achieve predictability in favor of “[w]ell-
articulated policy.”211  In sum, if the Federal Circuit could reverse incorrect 
factual determinations without finding clear error, and if it could write 
more persuasive opinions, Professor Dreyfuss believes the Federal Circuit 
would develop a patent law that relies less on rules and more on 
standards.212 
Professor Dreyfuss also suggests that the Supreme Court may be able 
to influence the Federal Circuit’s preference for rule-based adjudication.  
To do so, however, given resistance by the Federal Circuit, the Court “will 
likely have to decide a few more cases and write sharply worded opinions 
that clearly state what it sees as the problems and how it thinks the court 
should go about correcting them.”213  She advises that, if the Supreme 
Court decides that the Federal Circuit is “just one more appellate court,” 
then the Court “ought to make more explicit the direction that patent law 
should take.”214  But, if the Supreme Court decides that the Federal Circuit 
is a “tribunal with a unique role in shaping patent law,” then the Court 
“needs to reshape procedural law”—presumably Rule 52—“to take that 
role into account.”215  More generally, she also has argued that the 
Supreme Court needs to “help the Federal Circuit find the ‘sweet spot’ 
between rigid rules and standards.”216 
Other than Professor Dreyfuss, Professor John Golden has focused on 
the Supreme Court’s ability generally to police the development of patent 
law by the Federal Circuit.217  Professor Golden, however, has suggested 
that those dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit’s doctrinal choices—and 
even those concerned with its formalistic rule-based adjudication—should 
be wary of Supreme Court intervention.218  He emphasizes that cost, delay, 
uncertainty, and lack of predictability result from the Supreme Court’s 
intervention in patent cases, with the possible result that substantive patent 
law articulated by the Supreme Court will be worse than that articulated by 
the Federal Circuit.219  In particular, he challenges the notion that the 
Supreme Court is a generalist court, reminds readers that it has no 
expertise in patent law, suggests that it may be at least as subject to capture 
as the Federal Circuit, and explains that it may be subject to manipulation 
                                                                                                                          
211 Id. at 805. 
212 Id.  
213 Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 825.   
214 Id. at 828. 
215 Id.   
216 Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 799. 
217 See Golden, supra note 11, at 672–73 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s role with regard to 
substantive patent law). 
218 Id. at 686. 
219 Id. at 687–88. 
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and error.220 
He identifies two Supreme Court opinions illustrating problems with 
manipulation and error: Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical 
Co.221 and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.222  Regarding the former, he 
concludes that it “illustrates (1) the costs in uncertainty and disruption that 
Supreme Court intervention typically produces and (2) the poor 
craftsmanship that can mark the Court’s opinions on questions of 
substantive patent law.”223  Regarding the latter, he points out how the 
Court similarly “tripped over problems that the Court did not even 
recognize existed” and, moreover, “deliver[ed] a complementary blow to 
the generalist court rationale for Supreme Court review” by mishandling an 
issue that had to do with a general legal principle rather than a patent law 
principle.224 
He points out that, given the lack of intercircuit splits regarding 
substantive patent law issues, the Supreme Court is unable to choose 
between alternative doctrinal formulations developed by lower courts.225  
Instead, if it rejects the Federal Circuit’s law, the Court must forge its own 
new, untested formulation of patent law.226  Given the Court’s lack of 
expertise, manipulation and error suggest that the Federal Circuit may be 
better positioned to lead the development of substantive patent law.227  
Thus, he suggests that “we abandon the vision of the Supreme Court as a 
source of stability and finality” and instead use the Court to prevent 
ossification of patent law by having the Court take patent cases in doctrinal 
areas in which the Federal Circuit has either set forth law too quickly or 
allowed it to remain untested for too long.228  In short, “[b]y periodically 
taking on merits review in areas where Federal Circuit decisions may have 
unduly ossified the law, the Supreme Court can help initiate escapes from 
suboptimal legal equilibria.”229 
Finally, Professor Peter Lee has focused his suggestions on 
“methodological prescriptions to guide the [Supreme] Court during its 
chosen interventions.”230  In particular, he has suggested that “the Supreme 
Court should be aware of the ‘costly’ nature of broad standards and their 
                                                                                                                          
220 Id. at 688 
221 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
222 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
223 Golden, supra note 11, at 693. 
224 Id. at 693–94. 
225 Id. at 700–01.  
226 See id. at 701 (explaining that reviewing issues by different circuits allows the courts of 
appeals to experiment with different rules and provide the Supreme Court with information and 
options). 
227 Id. at 704–05. 
228 Id. at 701. 
229 Id. at 720. 
230 Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 76. 
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implications for patent adjudication by generalist judges.”231  Reflecting his 
assessment of the effects of the formalistic tendencies of the Federal 
Circuit, his proposal seeks to guide the Supreme Court “to retain the value 
of a flexible, holistic approach to patent law while providing guidance to 
district judges facing highly technical inquiries.”232 
While these scholars have suggested ways in which the Supreme Court 
might effectively police rule-based adjudication at the Federal Circuit—a 
topic I will rejoin shortly—none of these scholars have comprehensively 
analyzed the Supreme Court’s history of policing rule-based adjudication 
at the Federal Circuit.233  I provide this analysis next. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Policing of Rule-Based Adjudication in Patent 
Law 
This Section fills a void in the academic discourse by providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the Supreme Court’s history of policing the 
Federal Circuit’s adoption of rule-based adjudication in patent cases over 
the first three decades of the Federal Circuit’s existence.  What this 
analysis shows is that, until recently, the Supreme Court had not engaged 
in any real effort to police any over-use of rule-based adjudication by the 
Federal Circuit. 
1.  The First Decade:  Indifference and Rules 
In the first decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence,234 the Supreme 
Court primarily showed indifference—some might say deferential 
silence—toward the Federal Circuit’s stewardship of the nation’s patent 
law.235 
In the first case, Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp.,236 the 
Supreme Court did not even review the merits of any issue of patent law 
decided by the Federal Circuit.  The Court primarily just asked the Federal 
Circuit to explain the basis of its judgment reversing a district court’s 
                                                                                                                          
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Professor Holbrook has addressed the Supreme Court’s role with respect to formalism in 
patent law adjudication and, as a descriptive matter, concluded that the Supreme Court prefers to 
implement procedural rules rather than alter substantive rules of patent law.  Holbrook, The Supreme 
Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 9. 
234 The first decade spanned from October 1, 1982 to September 30, 1992.  Harold C. Petrowitz, 
Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982—and Beyond, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 
543, 543 (1983). 
235 See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of 
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 276–77 (“[N]eglecting the field—or, rather, neglecting the field even 
more than it already had been—seemed to be the course that the Court was choosing during the first 
decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence, when the Court’s already low rate of granting certiorari in 
patent cases declined even further.”). 
236 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (per curiam).  
 2013] FORMALISM AND ANTIFORMALSM IN PATENT LAW ADJUDICATION 449 
obviousness determination.237  In particular, the Court refused to consider, 
without further analysis by the Federal Circuit, “the complex issue of the 
degree to which the obviousness determination is one of fact” and 
therefore the appropriate standard of review of an obviousness 
determination on appeal.238  The Supreme Court did, however, include one 
important comment, that subsidiary determinations of fact made by district 
courts during an obviousness analysis are subject to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a).239  As discussed above, this sentence may have led to 
overuse of rule-based adjudication by the Federal Circuit in an effort to 
circumscribe district court decision making.240 
In the next case, Christianson v. Colt Industrial Operating Corp.,241 
the Supreme Court likewise did not review the merits of any issue of 
substantive patent law decided by the Federal Circuit.242  Nevertheless, 
Christianson is notable because the Court resolved the disputed procedural 
issue243 by applying a test that is more like a rule rather than a standard.  In 
particular, the Court held that the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction 
should be measured by determining whether a substantial question of 
patent law is a necessary element of one of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded 
claims.244  The Court rejected a more standard-like approach that would fix 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction by reference to the theories actually 
presented to the court and jury.245  The Court thus adopted a test that could 
be used ex ante by parties—at the pleading stage of litigation—to 
determine whether an appeal would be within the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction.  Indeed, the Court justified its preferred test by indicating it 
would create uniformity and reduce uncertainty.246   
In the last case, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,247 the Supreme 
                                                                                                                          
237 See id. at 811 (“In the absence of an opinion clearly setting forth the views of the Court of 
Appeals on these matters, we are not prepared to give plenary consideration to petitioner’s claim that 
the decision below cannot be squared with Rule 52(a).  Instead, we grant the petition for certiorari, 
vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of 
Rule 52(a).”). 
238 Id.   
239 See id. (“[W]hether or not the ultimate question of obviousness is a question of fact subject to 
Rule 52(a), the subsidiary determinations of the District Court, at the least, ought to be subject to the 
Rule.”). 
240 See supra Part III.A.2. 
241 486 U.S. 800 (1988).  
242 See id. at 818 (agreeing with the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction, but 
disapproving of the Federal Circuit’s decision to examine the merits of the case).   
243 The Court resolved a “jurisdictional battle” between the Federal Circuit and the Seventh 
Circuit, each of which “adamantly disavowed jurisdiction,” in favor of the Federal Circuit’s more 
restrictive view of its jurisdiction.  Id. at 803. 
244 Id. at 808–09. 
245 Id. at 813–14. 
246 Id. at 813. 
247 496 U.S. 661 (1990).  
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Court—eight years after the establishment of the Federal Circuit—finally 
reached the merits of a disputed issue of substantive patent law.248  Again, 
notably, the Court adopted a rule-like test rather than a standard.  
Affirming the Federal Circuit, the Court held that a statutory exception to 
infringement covers activities related, not just to drugs, but also to medical 
devices.249  The Court based this ruling on the literal meaning of the statute 
even though it found difficulty identifying normative reasons justifying the 
scope of the exception.250  The Court pointed out that, had Congress sought 
to limit the exception to drugs, Congress clearly could have done so using 
different language.251  Moreover, by adopting an interpretation covering 
both drugs and medical devices, the Court eliminated a more difficult line-
drawing exercise. 
Thus, in this first decade the Supreme Court did not act to reject rule-
based adjudication in favor of standard-based adjudication in patent law.  
Moreover, the Court did not police any preference of the Federal Circuit 
for rule-based adjudication.  The Court reviewed only three patent cases 
decided by the Federal Circuit during its first decade, and it adopted rule-
like tests governing both procedural and substantive issues in the two cases 
reaching the merits.  Indeed, the Supreme Court effectively deferred to the 
Federal Circuit on practically all matters the entire decade despite the 
Federal Circuit’s resolution of significant patent law disputes and 
application of rule-based adjudication.252 
2.  The Second Decade:  Rules and Standards 
In the second decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence,253 the Court 
granted certiorari to the Federal Circuit and rendered opinions related to 
                                                                                                                          
248 See id. at 663–64 (outlining the issue of whether activities that normally constituted patent 
infringement were non-infringing under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) if they were performed for the purpose 
of submitting information for consideration by the FDA). 
249 Id. at 674.  
250 See id. at 668 (“[O]ne must admit that while the provision more naturally means what 
respondent suggests, it is somewhat difficult to understand why anyone would want it to mean that.”); 
see also id. at 669 (“As far as the text is concerned, therefore, we conclude that we have before us a 
provision that somewhat more naturally reads as the Court of Appeals determined, but that is not 
plainly comprehensible on anyone’s view . . . . We think the Court of Appeals’ interpretation is 
confirmed, however, by the structure of the 1984 Act taken as a whole.”). 
251 Id. at 667–68. 
252 See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872, 876–77 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (requiring intent to deceive rather than merely gross negligence to find inequitable 
conduct); Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(“Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed 
invention, absent some teaching, suggestion or incentive supporting the combination.”). 
253 The second decade spanned from October 1, 1992 to September 30, 2002.  Petrowitz, supra 
note 234, at 543. 
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patent law in nine cases.254  The tests the Court articulated in these nine 
cases, unlike those articulated in the cases from the first decade of the 
Federal Circuit’s existence, sometimes resembled standards. 
a.  Rule-Like Tests 
In five of the nine cases, the Supreme Court articulated tests that 
appear more like rules.255  The earliest example is Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc.,256 where the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding 
that courts rather than juries interpret terms in patent claims.257  The only 
other option the Court considered, however, was another rule, that juries 
interpret terms in patent claims.258  A later example is J.E.M. Ag Supply, 
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,259 where the Court held that 
newly developed plant breeds constitute eligible subject matter for 
purposes of utility patents.260  In doing so, though, the Court merely upheld 
the Federal Circuit’s decision to adopt this same bright-line rule.261  
Similarly, in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, 
Inc.,262 the Supreme Court took a rule-based approach to the question of 
                                                                                                                          
254 I have excluded four patent cases where the Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Federal Circuit but did not address any issue of patent law.  See Talbert Fuel Sys. 
Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 537 U.S. 802 (2002) (granting the writ of certiorari, vacating the Federal 
Circuit’s judgment, and remanding the case to the Federal Circuit without reaching the merits); Nelson 
v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 463 (2000) (reaching a holding related to due process requirements 
and not patent law); Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. 1111, 1111–12 (1997) (granting the 
writ of certiorari, vacating the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanding the case to the Federal 
Circuit without reaching the merits); Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 
510 U.S. 27, 28 (1993) (per curiam) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).  I have 
also excluded a case that was not directed toward patent law, but rather to the Plant Variety Protection 
Act.  See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995) (considering the question of 
whether there is a limit to the quantity of protected, novel seed varieties a farmer can sell to other 
farmers under an exemption to the Plant Variety Protection Act).   
255 See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002) 
(applying a rule-based approach to the question of the appropriate scope of the statute governing the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 
(2001) (holding that newly created plant breeds are eligible to receive utility patent protection); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999) (holding 
that Congress exceeded the bounds of its authority in enacting the Patent Remedy Act); Pfaff v. Wells 
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998) (adopting a two-part test governing the on-sale bar); Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that courts, rather than juries, construe 
patent claims). 
256 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
257 Id. at 372. 
258 Id.  Professor Holbrook has noted that the Supreme Court’s focus in Markman on uniformity 
and certainty “added support for the Federal Circuit’s preference for crystal rules.”  Holbrook, The 
Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 7. 
259 534 U.S. 124. 
260 Id. at 127. 
261 Id. at 145–46. 
262 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
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the appropriate appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.263  
Significantly, the Federal Circuit itself had adopted a rule, that an answer 
with a compulsory counterclaim alleging patent infringement would cause 
the Federal Circuit to have appellate jurisdiction.264  The Court held to the 
contrary and, as a result, merely swapped one rule for another.265  Thus, out 
of the five cases adopting rules, the Court’s holdings in the three cases 
named above supply little evidence of a predilection for rules by 
comparison to the Federal Circuit.   
Next, in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., the Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s totality-of-the-circumstances test governing the statutory on-sale 
bar.266  As discussed above, the Federal Circuit adopted this test to govern 
the question of whether an invention had been placed on sale in 
circumstances where an idea had not been incorporated into something 
built and tested.267  Notably, the Court indicated it was concerned that the 
Federal Circuit’s test produced too much uncertainty.268  Indeed, given the 
Federal Circuit’s test, inventors faced difficulty determining ex ante 
whether they would be barred from obtaining patents on their inventions.269  
Thus, in place of the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court adopted 
its own two-part test that—at least relative to a totality-of-the-
circumstances test—resembles a rule.270  The Court’s test requires (1) a 
product to be “the subject of a commercial offer for sale” and (2) a related 
invention that is “ready for patenting.”271  As Professor Holbrook 
recognized, “the Court criticized the Federal Circuit for using a vague 
standard and, in its place, articulated a more formalistic approach.”272  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the “ready for patenting” 
prong of the Court’s test actually is standard-like, given its vague nature, 
dependency on context, and subjectiveness.  Thus, the Court’s approach 
was only marginally more formalistic than the Federal Circuit’s approach, 
at least in the sense of reflecting rule-based adjudication. 
The fifth case is Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
                                                                                                                          
263 Id. at 830. 
264 See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 738−45 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (finding that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over appeals from cases 
involving no claim for infringement but instead a compulsory counterclaim for patent infringement), 
overruled by Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002), as 
recognized in Telecomm Technical Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Commc’ns, Inc., 295 F.3d 1249, 
1251–52 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
265 Holmes Grp., Inc., 535 U.S. at 834. 
266 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998) (applying instead a two-part test). 
267 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  
268 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67. 
269 Thomas, supra note 16, at 778−79. 
270 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67. 
271 Id. 
272 Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 8. 
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Board v. College Savings Bank,273 where the Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s holding that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign 
immunity for patent infringement.274  The Court applied what appears to be 
a rule that, absent proper abrogation of state sovereign immunity by 
Congress, a state may not otherwise be sued for patent infringement unless 
the state itself waives sovereign immunity.275  Given that waiver may be 
constructive and not just express, however, the reality is that determining 
whether a state has waived its sovereign immunity often is more akin to a 
standard-based analysis.276  In short, like in Pfaff, the Court’s holding in 
Florida Prepaid can hardly be labeled formalistic in the sense of favoring 
rules over standards. 
In sum, while each of these five cases involved the Supreme Court 
establishing what appear to be rule-like tests governing legal issues, as 
shown, two of the five tests involve at least some standard-like analyses.  
Moreover, only in Pfaff did the Supreme Court reject the Federal Circuit’s 
adoption of a standard—yet even in that case the Court adopted a test with 
standard-like aspects. 
b.  Standard-Like Tests 
In the remaining four patent cases, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Federal Circuit and articulated legal tests more like standards rather than 
rules.277  In the earliest, Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, 
Inc.,278 the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s practice of vacating and 
dismissing as moot judgments of invalidity upon affirming judgments of 
non-infringement.279  Relying on underlying policy considerations as well 
as scholarly criticism, the Court rejected any per se rule of mootness in 
favor of a standard that gives courts discretion to determine, based on the 
circumstances of any particular case, whether an invalidity claim is moot 
                                                                                                                          
273 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
274 Id. at 630. 
275 See id. at 647–48 (holding that Congress acted in excess of its authority when it invalidated 
state sovereign immunity in cases of patent infringement). 
276 See generally Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(conducting a waiver analysis and concluding that a state university waived its sovereign immunity by 
initiating and actively participating in Patent Office proceedings). 
277 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738−42 (2002) 
(“[W]e have consistently applied the doctrine [of prosecution history estoppel] in a flexible way, not a 
rigid one.”); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152−54 (1999) (holding that the Federal Circuit must 
abide by the standard of review contained in the Administrative Procedure Act); Warner-Jenkinson Co. 
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 (1997) (refusing to apply a more rigid rule for 
prosecution history estoppel); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 99−103 (1993) 
(rejecting the Federal Circuit’s practice of vacating and dismissing judgments on claims of invalidity 
whenever it affirmed judgments of non-infringement, but recognizing continued discretion whether to 
exercise existing jurisdiction). 
278 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
279 Id. at 102. 
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after a holding of non-infringement.280 
Later, in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,281 the 
Court similarly rejected a bright-line rule in favor of a flexible standard, 
this one related to the doctrine of equivalents.282  Rather than establish a 
rule that any amendment to a patent claim eliminates the ability to rely 
upon the doctrine of equivalents to prove infringement, the Court held that 
a court must “probe[] the reasoning behind the Patent Office’s insistence 
upon a change in the claims” and may prohibit a patentee from relying on 
the doctrine of equivalents only if the patentee is unable to establish a 
purpose unrelated to the requirements of patentability.283  Poignantly, the 
Court noted that it saw no reason to adopt a “rigid rule” governing the 
relationship between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of 
equivalents, even if it could provide a brighter line and therefore more 
certainty and reviewability in this area of patent law.284  In this regard, 
however, the Supreme Court’s holding was actually consistent with the 
holding of the Federal Circuit, which explicitly required inquiry into the 
reasons for an amendment.285 
Next, in Dickinson v. Zurko, as discussed above, the Supreme Court 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s view that it should apply the “clearly 
erroneous” standard when it reviews findings of fact made by the Patent 
Office.286  Instead, the Court concluded that judges must apply the less 
strict standard articulated in the Administrative Procedure Act, which 
requires a reviewing court to set aside an agency finding found to be 
                                                                                                                          
280 Id. at 99−103.  The court expressly recognized that the Federal Circuit had adopted a “uniform 
practice or rule.”  Id. at 92 n.12. 
281 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
282 Id. at 32 & n.6. 
283 Id. at 31, 40−41. 
284 See id. at 32 (“[W]e see no substantial cause for requiring a more rigid rule invoking an 
estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change [to claim language].”); id. at 32 n.6 (“That petitioner’s 
rule might provide a brighter line for determining whether a patentee is estopped under certain 
circumstances is not a sufficient reason for adopting such a rule.”); id. at 39 n.8 (“We leave it to the 
Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and 
reviewability to this area of the law.”).  Professor Holbrook ultimately concludes that the reasoning the 
Court used to adopt the all elements rule and the rebuttable presumption with respect to prosecution 
history—certainty and public notice—“perhaps further embolden[ed] the Federal Circuit’s efforts” to 
create bright line rules.  Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 8.  To the extent 
it did embolden the Federal Circuit, however, the Federal Circuit would have had to ignore the Court’s 
explicit rejection of a “rigid rule” governing the relationship between prosecution history estoppel and 
the doctrine of equivalents. 
285 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“Whenever prosecution history estoppel is invoked as a limitation to infringement under the doctrine 
of equivalents, ‘a close examination must be made as to, not only what was surrendered, but also the 
reason for such a surrender.’” (quoting Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 
698, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1990))), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).   
286 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152−54 (1999). 
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“unsupported by substantial evidence.”287  As a result of this decision, 
courts effectively must give more deference to factual determinations made 
by the Patent Office.288 
Finally, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,289 
the Court held that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is a 
flexible, not a complete, bar to the doctrine of equivalents.290  Because the 
Court focused on the flexibility of the standard it articulated and criticized 
the rigidity of the Federal Circuit’s complete bar approach,291 Festo is a 
favorite example for those who claim the Supreme Court takes a less 
formalistic view of patent law compared to the Federal Circuit.292  
Nevertheless, as Professor Thomas has recognized, the law the Supreme 
Court articulated “in fact fell far short of returning to a ‘flexible bar’ 
standard” and thus “largely vindicates increasingly restrictive Federal 
Circuit practices regarding the doctrine of equivalents.”293 
When analyzing the Supreme Court’s four patent cases adopting 
standards during the Federal Circuit’s second decade, it is important to 
recognize that the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s use of a 
rule-like test in favor of a standard-like test in only two of the cases—
Cardinal Chemical and Festo. 
*** 
In summary, in the second decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence, 
the Supreme Court adopted rule-like tests in five cases and standard-like 
tests in four.  Moreover, of the five cases adopting rule-like tests, two 
ultimately allowed for some standard-based adjudication based on the 
resulting, underlying legal determinations.294  On the other hand, while the 
Court rejected bright-line rules embraced by the Federal Circuit in favor of 
                                                                                                                          
287 Id. at 152−53 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994)). 
288 Here the Supreme Court rejected an instance of patent law exceptionalism: the idea that patent 
law may be, or even should be, unique.  I return to this topic below in the context of rule-based versus 
standard-based adjudication.  See infra Part V.A.1.d.  For more recent examples of the Court’s 
skepticism of patent law exceptionalism, see MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), 
and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), where the Court was “interested in 
conforming patent law to broader legal doctrines and principles.”  Lee, Patent Law and the Two 
Cultures, supra note 16, at 77–78.  For a fundamental examination of the assumptions underlying 
patent law exceptionalism and its resulting problems, see Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from 
Industrial Policy to Intellectual Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1169−76 (2012).   
289 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
290 Id. at 738−42. 
291 Id. 
292 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 16, at 1120−21 (citing Festo as an example of a case where the 
Supreme Court applied a more flexible standard compared to a rule used by the Federal Circuit). 
293 Thomas, supra note 16, at 786. 
294 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Pfaff  
v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
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flexible standards in Cardinal Chemical and Festo, the Court did the 
opposite in Pfaff.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s second decade of review, 
like the first decade, does not reflect the Supreme Court taking a vigorous 
stand rejecting rule-based adjudication in favor of standard-based 
adjudication, but instead indicates an openness to rule-based and standard-
based adjudication in appropriate circumstances.  Nevertheless, compared 
to the first decade, the second decade represented a shift at the Supreme 
Court toward standards and against rules in patent cases.  Conversely, 
“[d]uring the second decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence, patent 
jurisprudence [at the Federal Circuit] ha[d] become increasingly oriented 
towards simple rules.”295 
3.   The Third Decade:  An Emerging Systemic Preference for 
Standards 
While scholars labeled the Federal Circuit as a formalist court at the 
beginning of its third decade of existence,296 the Supreme Court did not 
earn its reputation for rejecting rules in favor of standards in patent cases 
until later that decade.  By the conclusion of the decade, the Court had 
granted certiorari to the Federal Circuit and rendered opinions related to 
patent law in fourteen cases.297  In ten of the fourteen cases, the Court 
adopted a standard-like test.  
a.  Rule-Like Tests 
First consider the four cases adopting rule-like tests.298  In the earliest 
case, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,299 the Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s expansive reading of the statute governing infringement 
                                                                                                                          
295 Thomas, supra note 16, at 778. 
296 The third decade was between October 1, 2002 and September 30, 2012.  Petrowitz, supra note 
234, at 543.  By 2003, Professors Holbrook, Rai, and Thomas had labeled the Federal Circuit as a 
formalist court.  Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 2−3; Rai, supra note 16, 
at 1114; Thomas, supra note 16, at 777. 
297 I have excluded three patent cases from my count.  See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 
556 U.S. 635, 636 (2009) (resolving a non-patent law issue); Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 
U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. 
v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 397–99 (2006) (resolving a non-patent law issue). 
298 See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1675 (2012) (holding that a 
generic manufacturer sued for patent infringement may counterclaim challenging the accuracy of the 
description that the brand name manufacturer submitted to the FDA); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 
S. Ct. 2238, 2250−52 (2011) (holding that clear and convincing evidence is always required to 
invalidate a patent); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2188, 2192 (2011) (holding that title to federally funded inventions vests in inventors rather than in 
federal contractors); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 447−59 (2007) (requiring a copy 
of software supplied from the United States to be combined abroad to form the patented invention for 
liability to attach under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)). 
299 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
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by exportation.300  Based on policy concerns related to the ease of copying 
software, the Federal Circuit had developed a standard-like test, which in 
effect meant that sending a single copy of software abroad with the intent 
that it be replicated abroad invoked liability for each foreign-made copy.301  
Unlike the Federal Circuit, the Court was unwilling to let policy justify 
outcome; it adopted a rule-based test, which considers a copy of software 
to have been supplied from the United States only when that copy is 
“combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue.”302  The Court 
bluntly rejected the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that policy should direct 
statutory interpretation.303  Ultimately, the Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s standard-like test because it did not find any support in the 
relevant statute, because of its concern with extraterritoriality, and because 
it did not view its role as one of dynamically interpreting the relevant 
statute based on policy-oriented concerns.304 
In the next case, Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior 
University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.,305 the Court held that a statute 
does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal 
contractors.306  Instead, federal contractors must obtain assignments from 
inventors.307  Note that while the Court adopted a rule governing the 
disputed issue, both parties presented competing rules for the Court to 
adopt, essentially whether or not rights to inventions automatically vest in 
federal contractors.308  Moreover, the Court ultimately agreed with the 
Federal Circuit’s rule on point, that ownership of inventions automatically 
vests in inventors.309 
In the third case, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.,310 the Court concluded 
that clear and convincing evidence is required to invalidate a patent.311  
Rather than allow consideration of functional reasons why a lesser amount 
of evidence might be appropriate in a particular situation—and there are 
                                                                                                                          
300 Id. at 447−59. 
301 Id. at 452. 
302 Id. at 453. 
303 See id. at 457 (“[W]e are not persuaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of [the relevant 
statutory subsection] is in order.”). 
304 Id. at 452−58. 
305 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011). 
306 Id. at 2192. 
307 Id. at 2195–99. 
308 See id. (describing and rejecting the petitioner’s reading of the statute). 
309 In this case the Supreme Court recognized a principle of patent law exceptionalism.  In the 
words of the court, “it is often the case that whatever an employee produces in the course of his 
employment belongs to his employer” but “patent law has always been different.”  Id. at 2196.  Below I 
address patent law exceptionalism as a basis to support rule-based adjudication.  See infra Part V.A.1.d. 
310 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
311 Id. at 2242. 
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many such reasons312—the Court decided that clear and convincing 
evidence is always required.313  Other than the statutory text, the Court’s 
primary reason for holding that clear and convincing evidence is always 
required was its own precedent314 and the fact that, for nearly thirty years, 
the Federal Circuit had applied the same rule requiring clear and 
convincing evidence.315 
In Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk,316 the 
Supreme Court held that a generic manufacturer sued for patent 
infringement by a brand manufacturer may file a counterclaim challenging 
the accuracy of a description, submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) by the brand manufacturer, of the scope of the 
asserted patent.317  The Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision to the 
contrary based on the context of the relevant statute.318  Thus, the Court 
replaced a bright-line rule (a generic manufacturer is not allowed to file a 
counterclaim seeking to correct an inaccurate description) with another 
bright-line rule (a generic manufacturer is allowed to file such a 
counterclaim). 
Thus, in only one of these four cases adopting a rule did the Supreme 
Court reject a standard adopted by the Federal Circuit, but in that case the 
Supreme Court rejected policy-based justifications for that standard.  
Moreover, in two of these cases the Supreme Court adopted the very same 
rule used by the Federal Circuit. 
b.  Standard-Like Tests 
Now, consider the ten cases from the third decade of the Federal 
Circuit’s existence where the Court adopted standard-like tests.319  The 
                                                                                                                          
312 See David O. Taylor, Clear but Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit’s Invalidity Standard, 21 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 293, 312–18 (2011) (identifying reasons why a 
preponderance standard of proof may be appropriate in some circumstances). 
313 See i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2250–52 (“[T]he challenger[] [has the] burden to persuade the jury of 
its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence . . . .”). 
314 See id. at 2245 (stating that the decision in Radio Corporation of America v. Radio 
Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934), “is authoritative”). 
315 Id. at 2243, 2251. 
316 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012). 
317 Id. at 1675. 
318 See id. at 1681–84 (“The statutory scheme . . . contemplates that one patented use will not 
foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones.  Within that framework, the counterclaim 
naturally functions to challenge the brand’s assertion of rights over whichever discrete use (or uses) the 
generic company wishes to pursue.”). 
319 See Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012) (holding inter alia that a district court has 
broad discretion over the weight given to new evidence introduced in a civil action challenging the 
Patent Office’s decision to reject a patent application); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) (holding that patent claims must include an “inventive concept” not 
to be preempted by the prohibition against patents on natural laws); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070–71 (2011) (adopting a standard for inducement of infringement that 
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earliest example is Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,320 in which 
the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s narrow interpretation of a statutory 
safe harbor provision that makes certain experimental conduct non-
infringing activity.321  In particular, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
rule limiting the statutory safe harbor to uses of patented inventions that 
result in a submission of information to the FDA.  Instead, the Court 
interpreted the safe harbor broadly to cover uses of patented inventions 
where there was a reasonable basis to believe that the uses would produce 
types of information that are relevant to the FDA.322  In this way, the Court 
built its test upon the classic standard of reasonableness. 
Next, consider Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.323  In 
this case, the Court concluded that the existence of a patent on a tying 
product does not create a presumption of market power for purposes of an 
allegation of an antitrust violation for illegal tying.324  Instead, the party 
alleging an antitrust violation must prove that the patent owner has market 
power.325  Thus, the Court replaced a rule (a presumption of market power) 
and its underlying standard (a patentee may overcome the presumption by 
showing that it does not have market power), with just a standard (the 
antitrust claimant must show that the patentee has market power).  
Significantly, however, the Federal Circuit derived the presumption of 
market power from Supreme Court precedent.326  Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s replacement of a rule with a standard in this case speaks little 
regarding any policing of the Federal Circuit’s preference for rules. 
                                                                                                                          
permits a finding of actual knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218, 3229–30 (2010) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the machine-or-
transformation test is the exclusive test for determining patent eligibility); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008) (finding that exhaustion applies to method patents and a license 
authorizing the sale of components that substantially embody the patents in suit); KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s TSM test in favor of an 
“expansive and flexible approach” to the question of non-obviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (indicating that courts should determine whether the alleged 
facts suggest that a controversy is real, immediate, and significant before finding declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (outlining a four-factor test 
to determine whether to grant injunctive relief); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 
45–46 (2006) (holding that there is no presumption of market power even when there is a patent for 
purposes of an allegation of antitrust liability for illegal tying); Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–07 (2005) (favoring a broad interpretation of non-infringement statutory safe 
harbor). 
320 545 U.S. 193. 
321 See id. at 205–08 (“[T]o construe [the statutory provision] as the Court of Appeals did . . . is 
effectively to limit assurance of exemption to the activities necessary to seek approval of a generic 
drug. . . . The statutory text does not require such a result.”). 
322 Id. at 207. 
323 547 U.S. 28. 
324 Id. at 31. 
325 Id. at 46. 
326 See id. at 33 (describing the Federal Circuit’s adherence to Supreme Court precedent). 
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Another case in which the Supreme Court overturned the Federal 
Circuit’s use of a rule in favor of a standard is eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.327  In this case, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s use of a 
“general rule” that injunctive relief follows an adjudication of 
infringement.328  The Court held that there is no presumption in favor of 
injunctive relief, and instead courts must apply what the Court deemed to 
be equity’s traditional four-factor test.329  This test requires the patentee to 
demonstrate:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships . . . a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.330   
While the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” was a classic rule-like shortcut, 
the Court’s four-factor test is a classic standard. 
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,331 the Supreme Court yet again 
rejected a rule developed by the Federal Circuit in favor of a standard.332  
In contrast to the Federal Circuit, the Court determined that it would not 
require termination or breach of license agreements before licensees would 
be permitted to request declarations that the licensed patents were invalid, 
not infringed, or unenforceable.333  Rather, the Court articulated a standard 
for determining whether a licensee could establish declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction—“whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show 
that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment”334—that, as the Court itself conceded, does “not 
draw the brightest of lines.”335 
The Supreme Court, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,336 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of a rule in favor of a 
standard-like approach.  The Federal Circuit’s rule required a party 
alleging obviousness of a claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) to 
                                                                                                                          
327 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
328 Id. at 390–91. 
329 Id. at 391. 
330 Id. 
331 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
332 See id. at 135 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s application of the common-law rule providing 
that a contracting party “cannot at one and the same time challenge its validity and continue to reap its 
benefits”). 
333 Id. at 137. 
334 Id. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
335 Id. 
336 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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satisfy the TSM test.337  The Court did not mince words in rejecting the 
Federal Circuit’s application of its test as a “rigid approach” contrary to the 
“expansive and flexible approach” to obviousness reflected in the Court’s 
precedent.338  Indeed, even after recognizing that “it can be important to 
identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the 
relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new 
invention does,” the Court criticized the Federal Circuit for converting a 
“helpful insight” into a “rigid and mandatory formula[].”339  Moreover, the 
Court indicated that the “obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a 
formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and 
motivation.”340  Instead, the Court favored a “functional approach” that 
involves “a broad inquiry”341 including consideration of various 
“secondary considerations,” such as “commercial success, long felt but 
unsolved needs, [and] failure of others.”342 
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,343 the Supreme 
Court rejected another bright-line rule adopted by the Federal Circuit, that 
method patents as a category are not subject to the exhaustion doctrine.344  
In place of this bright-line rule, the Court articulated a framework for 
determining whether exhaustion applies to a method patent by examining 
whether components substantially embodying the method in question were 
the subject of a sale authorized by the patentee.345  The first portion of this 
test, whether components substantially embody the method patent in 
question, is standard-like, particularly when compared to the categorical 
approach of the Federal Circuit. 
The Supreme Court, in Bilski v. Kappos,346 yet again rejected a rule-
based test adopted by the Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit had 
concluded that the “machine-or-transformation” test was the exclusive test 
for determining patent eligibility with respect to processes.347  The Court 
rejected this test in no uncertain terms as being too categorical: “Rather 
than adopting categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and 
unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of 
                                                                                                                          
337 Id. at 407. 
338 Id. at 415. 
339 Id. at 418–19.  The Court would add that “when a court transforms the general principle into a 
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.”  Id. at 419.  
Similarly, the Court stated that “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common 
sense . . . are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”  Id. at 421. 
340 Id. at 419. 
341 Id. at 415. 
342 Id. at 406 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)). 
343 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
344 Id. at 621. 
345 Id. at 621, 638. 
346 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  
347 Id. at 3226. 
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this Court’s [precedent showing] that petitioners’ claims are not patentable 
processes because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas.”348  But the 
Court was not able to provide direction—other than to consult its 
precedent—to answer the question of what exactly qualifies as an abstract 
idea.349  As a result, the Court left the issue of whether an inventor has 
attempted to patent an abstract idea as a standard-based inquiry without 
any test, let alone a bright-line rule, governing the analysis.350 
In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,351 the Supreme Court 
decided that active inducement of infringement requires that the inducing 
party know that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.352  
Moreover, it rejected the Federal Circuit’s formulation of the test 
governing the minimum required knowledge.353  In place of the 
requirement to show a deliberate disregard of a known risk, the Court 
adopted a standard consistent with criminal law that permits a finding of 
actual knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness.354  Thus, while 
adopting a standard, the Court here merely supplanted the Federal Circuit’s 
use of a different standard. 
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of patent eligibility of processes 
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.355  As in 
Bilski, the Court applied a test more like a standard than the machine-or-
transformation test applied by the Federal Circuit.356  Here, the Court 
addressed the patent eligibility exception for natural laws.  The Court 
concluded that patents may not be granted to protect “processes that too 
                                                                                                                          
348 Id. at 3229–30.  Notably, the Court also rejected another categorical rule, albeit one not 
adopted by the Federal Circuit, which would have made all business methods ineligible for patenting.  
Id. at 3228. 
349 See id. at 3229–31 (“The Court . . . need not define further what constitutes a patentable 
‘process,’ beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in § 100(b) and looking to the 
guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Dierh.”). 
350 See id. at 3234–36 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying 
account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea.  Indeed, the Court does not even explain if it 
is using the machine-or-transformation criteria.  The Court essentially asserts its conclusion that 
petitioners’ application claims an abstract idea.”); Duffy, supra note 20, at 1277 (“The Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Bilski seems to permit . . . a standards-based approach, which relies on multiple 
criteria in deciding issues of patentable subject matter . . . .”). 
351 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
352 Id. at 2068. 
353 Id. at 2068–71. 
354 See id. at 2070–71 (“[T]he Courts of Appeals . . . all appear to agree on two basic 
requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact 
exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. . . . Under this 
formulation, a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high 
probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.”). 
355 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
356 See id. at 1296 (“[T]he ‘machine or transformation test’ is not a definitive test of patent 
eligibility, but only an important and useful clue.” (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3234–35 
(2010))). 
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broadly preempt the use of a natural law.”357  According to the Court, “a 
process that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other 
elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 
‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts 
to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”358  And if 
use of the terms “too broadly” and “significantly more” did not already 
highlight the standard-like form of the inquiry, the Court made it plainly 
evident in describing its test: “The question before us is whether the claims 
do significantly more than simply describe [natural relationships].  To put 
the matter more precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their 
statements of the [relationships] to allow the processes they describe to 
qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?”359  As if to 
confirm the standard-like form of this inquiry, the Court conceded that “the 
underlying functional concern here is a relative one: how much future 
innovation is foreclosed relative to the contribution of the inventor.”360 
In the last patent case of the third decade, Kappos v. Hyatt,361 the Court 
considered two questions: (1) whether there are any restrictions on the 
ability of a losing patent applicant to introduce new evidence in a district 
court proceeding challenging a rejection of a patent application by the 
Patent Office; and (2) the standard of review that a district court must use 
when considering any such new evidence.362  On both questions, the Court 
affirmed the Federal Circuit.  Applicants may introduce new evidence 
subject only to the rules applicable to all civil actions (the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and Civil Procedure),363 and the appropriate standard of review is 
                                                                                                                          
357 Id. at 1294. 
358 Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
359 Id. at 1297. 
360 Id. at 1303.  Interestingly, the Supreme Court attempted to justify the fact that its test did not 
distinguish among different laws of nature by pointing out that: 
Courts and judges are not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of 
judgments needed to distinguish among different laws of nature.  And so the cases 
have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature, 
mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily 
administered proxy for the underlying [policy] concern. 
Id.  The Supreme Court’s overall test is hardly a bright-line prohibition even if it is more of a bright 
line compared to an alternative.  Anyway, it was the patentee, not the Federal Circuit, who proposed a 
test distinguishing between laws of nature based on whether they interfere significantly with innovation 
in other fields.  Id.  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s test can hardly be characterized as a “bright-line 
prohibition” compared to the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test, rejected in Bilski.  
Regardless, the Court’s adoption of what it considered to be a more rule-like test based on the inability 
of a decision-maker to make a well-informed judgment is the type of analysis that I suggest courts use 
with respect to questions of rule-based adjudication in patent law.  See infra Part V.A.2. 
361 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012). 
362 Id. at 1694. 
363 Id. at 1700.   
 464 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:415 
de novo.364  The Court also held, consistent with Federal Circuit precedent, 
that the district court has broad discretion over the weight to be given new 
evidence.365  In this last respect, the Court affirmed an approach more 
consistent with a standard than a rule, but again this standard had already 
been developed by the Federal Circuit.366 
In these ten cases adopting standards, the Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s use of rules in a remarkable number of cases, seven.  And 
in doing so, it repeatedly criticized the Federal Circuit for being too rigid 
and categorical. 
*** 
In summary, the Supreme Court appears to have earned its reputation 
for rejecting rule-based adjudication in favor of standard-based 
adjudication during its third decade of review of Federal Circuit patent 
decisions.  While four cases adopted rule-like tests, the Supreme Court 
rejected a standard adopted by the Federal Circuit only once.  By contrast, 
the Court adopted standard-like tests in ten cases, and in seven of those 
cases the Court rejected rule-like tests adopted by the Federal Circuit.367 
4.  Conclusions 
While others designated the Federal Circuit as a formalist court at the 
beginning of its third decade based on a purported tendency to adopt rule-
based adjudication in patent cases too often, until now no one has provided 
a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which the Supreme Court has 
favored rules or standards or policed any such tendency of the Federal 
Circuit.  That analysis, conducted over the Federal Circuit’s entire 
existence, shows that the Supreme Court has rejected a standard-like test 
adopted by the Federal Circuit in a patent case and replaced it with a more 
rule-like test only twice, while it has done the opposite eight times.  
Moreover, in the thirty-plus years of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the 
                                                                                                                          
364 Id. 
365 Id. 
366 Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
367 As of this writing, we are only a year into the fourth decade, which spans from October 1, 
2012 to September 30, 2022, Petrowitz, supra note 234, at 543, and the Supreme Court has ruled in 
only two patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit.  In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the Court affirmed 
the Federal Circuit’s holding that a patent owner does not completely exhaust its patent rights by 
selling patented seeds.  133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013).  The Court’s decision rested on a rule-like 
premise, that the exhaustion doctrine does not eliminate the right to prohibit another from making a 
new product.  Id. at 1766–67.  In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the 
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Federal Circuit, ultimately concluding 
that cDNA is patent eligible but isolated DNA segments are not.  133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).  To 
distinguish between the two types of DNA, the Court, like the Federal Circuit, applied the “rule against 
patents on naturally occurring things.”  Id. at 2116.  Thus, in both cases, the Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court have applied the same rule-like tests. 
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Supreme Court has increasingly rejected rules in favor of standards in 
patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit, particularly in the third decade 
of the Federal Circuit’s existence.  In short, the Supreme Court has grown 
more likely to detect and correct formalistic rule-based adjudication at the 
Federal Circuit.  Thus, from an overall perspective, the Court might, as a 
descriptive matter, be seen as policing the tendency of the Federal Circuit 
to engage in rule-based adjudication. 
Some, however, might argue that the Federal Circuit’s persistence in 
adopting rule-based adjudication in patent cases, and the Supreme Court’s 
repeated rejection of that form of adjudication, indicates that the patent 
system is broken.  That is, some might argue that the Federal Circuit has 
not “gotten the message” that rule-based adjudication is inappropriate.  I 
will now consider whether there is an appropriate equilibrium between 
rule-based adjudication and standard-based adjudication in patent law, as 
well as whether the Supreme Court’s increasing suggestions that the 
Federal Circuit has improperly invoked bright-line rules368 actually reflects 
the proper functioning of the present institutional system.  Indeed, several 
normative questions remain, including whether patent law should favor 
rule-based adjudication; whether the Federal Circuit should adopt rule-like 
tests in particular matters of patent law; whether the Supreme Court should 
police the Federal Circuit’s apparent preference for rule-like tests and, if 
so, how it should carry out such policing; and whether the role of the 
Federal Circuit should change based on any such policing by the Supreme 
Court.  I address these normative questions next. 
V.  INSTITUTIONAL ROLES IN PATENT LAW ADJUDICATION 
Given that the real question that deserves attention is “what degree of 
formalism?,” rather than “formalist or not?,”369 it is surprising that most 
academic discourse to date on the topic of formalism and patent law has 
addressed only the latter question, reached the same conclusion that the 
Federal Circuit is formalist based on its preference for rules, and then—for 
those that have even reached the normative aspect of the latter 
question370—concluded that this is bad and proposed ways to reform the 
institutional structure and the Federal Circuit’s approach to patent cases.371  
There has not yet been extensive academic discourse on the former 
question, particularly from the normative perspective, as applied to patent 
                                                                                                                          
368 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002) 
(rejecting a bright line rule adopted by the Federal Circuit). 
369 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 640. 
370 Professor Lee largely avoided normative positions in his article addressing the general issue of 
formalism in patent law adjudication.  See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 25 
(“My aim is not to assess these mechanisms normatively so much as it is to describe them.”). 
371 See supra Part IV.A (discussing relevant scholarship). 
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law: What degree of rule-based adjudication in patent law adjudication is 
appropriate?372  Moreover, as discussed above, academic discourse also has 
largely avoided extensive consideration of the responsibility of the 
Supreme Court—not just the Federal Circuit—with respect to rule-based 
adjudication in patent law. 
To fill this gap in legal scholarship, I begin, in this Part, to address the 
question of what degree of rule-based adjudication in patent law may be 
appropriate by engaging in two related inquiries.  First, what are the 
policies that may favor rule-based adjudication in patent law, and, given 
these policies, in what areas of patent law should rule-based adjudication 
be considered as potentially more appropriate?  Inherent in this first 
inquiry is the merit of patent law exceptionalism as applied to rule-based 
adjudication—to what extent should patent law include more rules than 
other areas of law?  Second, to the extent that rule-based adjudication in 
patent law may be appropriate generally or as applied to particular areas of 
patent law, how should the Federal Circuit approach specific questions 
concerning the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication, particularly 
given its existence as a semi-specialized appellate court whose decisions 
are reviewed by a generalized court of last resort?  And, conversely, how 
should the Supreme Court, as a generalized court of last resort, review 
decisions by a semi-specialized intermediate appellate court when 
considering matters of rule-based adjudication?  By engaging in these 
inquiries, this Part evaluates the institutional roles of the Federal Circuit 
and Supreme Court in the development of patent law, with particular 
attention to the potential normative basis for rule-based adjudication in 
patent law.  And this Part ultimately identifies a general framework with 
particular practices that the respective courts should adopt to fulfill their 
proper institutional roles within the current institutional structure. 
A.  The Normative Basis for Rule-Based Adjudication in Patent Law 
What degree of rule-based adjudication is appropriate for legal issues 
                                                                                                                          
372 Professor Kumar, for example, has indicated that “it is unclear whether the Federal Circuit has 
acted improperly” by preferring rules to standards, when rules “decrease uncertainty and prevent 
repeated litigation on the same issues.”  Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 
278 (2013).  Professor Dreyfuss is one of the scholars to focus on this normative question.  On the one 
hand, she has explained that there are reasons to think that precision in patent law is “more important in 
some respects” than accuracy.  Dreyfuss, supra note 93, at 13.  On the other hand, she has also 
indicated that the Federal Circuit has gone too far in favoring precision over accuracy.  See Dreyfuss, 
supra note 9, at 800 (“[T]he problems with the Federal Circuit appear to be largely related to the 
question of accuracy.”).  Most recently, Professor Mullally proposed a framework to evaluate the need 
for certainty in patent law generally.  Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and 
Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1146–59 (2010).  She advocates the following “simple 
guideposts for addressing uncertainty: identifying with as much precision as possible the primary 
institution or actor responsible for the uncertainty; assessing different types of uncertainty; and lastly, 
taking into account the importance of other, countervailing values.”  Id. at 1146–47. 
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that arise in patent law?  To answer this question it is important to identify 
and study the policies that might favor rule-based adjudication.  While the 
general advantages of rule-based adjudication are discussed in detail 
above, judges and commentators routinely identify one overarching policy 
supporting rule-based adjudication in patent law: certainty.  For purposes 
of this analysis, certainty incorporates the concepts of clarity (the ability to 
understand the controlling law) and predictability (the ability to predict the 
application of the controlling law).373  There are various reasons that 
certainty should be considered as a possible justification for rule-based 
adjudication in patent law.  And, taken together, these reasons should drive 
the application of the policy of certainty to the ultimate jurisprudential 
question of whether particular patent law doctrines deserve rule-like tests. 
1.  Certainty 
Consider the four primary legal and policy-based justifications for 
emphasizing certainty in patent law adjudication: the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act, general principles of law, the Constitution, and what I 
will refer to as patent law exceptionalism. 
a.  The Federal Courts Improvement Act 
One source for the importance of certainty in patent law is the 
normative basis for the creation of the Federal Circuit, as reflected in the 
legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act.374  That 
legislative history indicates proponents of the Federal Circuit sought to 
strengthen the U.S. patent system, foster technological growth and 
industrial innovation, eliminate forum shopping among regional courts of 
appeal, and increase uniformity and reduce uncertainty in substantive 
patent law.375  Significantly, one might think that the latter reasons—
increasing uniformity and decreasing uncertainty—justify, not just the 
formation of the Federal Circuit, but also more generally rule-based 
adjudication in patent cases.  Judge Newman, for example, has invoked the 
Federal Circuit’s “assignment” and “role” of creating uniformity and 
certainty as a reason to favor “sharpened principles” and to create “stable 
and comprehensible” tests in patent law.376  Similarly, commentators have 
                                                                                                                          
373 See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit 
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1994) (describing clarity and 
predictability as important to patent law). 
374 Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
375 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20, 23 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 29 (1981). 
376 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“This court has sharpened the principles of claim construction, in fulfilling 
its assignment to bring national uniformity to patent principles.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 
251 F.3d 955, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“In this period of unprecedented 
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pointed to the legislative history behind the formation of the Federal 
Circuit as an explanation for the judges’ invocation of rule-based tests in 
patent law.377 
There is a good argument, however, that—technically—this may be a 
misapplication of the legislative history.  The discussion of the desire for 
more certainty in patent law, in context, referred to a reason for formation 
of the Federal Circuit.  In particular, proponents of the Federal Circuit 
desired to create a circuit court with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in 
patent cases because they wanted to eliminate circuit splits regarding 
patent law issues, which would give certainty to potential litigants based on 
uniformity of interpretation and application of patent law principles.  
Significantly, the creation and therefore existence of a single circuit court 
with exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases 
necessarily achieves that result.378  The Federal Circuit, so the thought 
went,379 as the only intermediate appellate court interpreting and applying 
                                                                                                                          
development of patent-supported biological advance, the nation needs a stable and comprehensible 
patent law, lest this court falter in its leading role in implementing the law’s fundamental purposes.”).  
Judge O’Malley likewise has indicated that “[t]he uniformity Congress hoped we would bring to the 
patent system is uniformity born of our own adjudicative function.”  Kathleen M. O’Malley, An 
Expanded “Slim Volume” on the Limited Role of Courts in Shaping Patent Policy, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 
91, 98 (2012) (emphasis added). 
377 See, e.g., David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of 
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647, 682 (2013) (“Bright-line rules are 
predictable and much easier to apply consistently—whether horizontally or vertically—than standards.  
Thus, the Federal Circuit’s actual and perceived special mandate [which the authors derive from the 
legislative history associated with the court’s formation] seems to have some power in explaining its 
preference for bright-line rules.”).  In explaining a perceived preference for rule-based adjudication, 
Professor Dreyfuss highlights the legislative history surrounding the formation of the court and its 
emphasis on predictability, the desire of its early judges to gain acceptance and permanence by 
emphasizing predictability, and the unique nature of the Federal Circuit judges and their background—
less drawn from academics and district courts and more with backgrounds tied to legislation.  Dreyfuss, 
supra note 9, at 814–22. 
378 See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1067 (2013) (“Congress ensured . . . uniformity by 
vesting exclusive jurisdiction over . . . patent cases in the federal district courts and exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit.”); Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Now that It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 735 (2004) (“[T]he 
goal of uniformity was achieved procedurally not by years of decisions but by a single act of Congress 
in granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.”); Pauline Newman, The 
Federal Circuit—A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 513, 524 (1992) (“A principal goal [of 
those who formed the Federal Circuit], the elimination of intercircuit differences, was achieved 
overnight, for after October 1, 1982 there was no other forum.”). 
379 The Federal Courts Improvement Act did not succeed in vesting the Federal Circuit with 
exclusive jurisdiction over all patent cases.  See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 
Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over cases 
where a patent infringement claim was brought only as a counterclaim).  In 2011, however, Congress 
amended the relevant statute to ensure that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all patent 
infringement cases.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 
331–32 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012)) (extending the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction 
to all cases involving compulsory counterclaims of patent infringement). 
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patent law, would inherently create uniformity because no other 
intermediate appellate court would interpret and apply patent law.  The 
court would be able to create one body of precedent rather than twelve 
created by the regional circuits in the absence of Supreme Court 
oversight.380  And this uniformity of precedent would necessarily increase 
certainty.  Moreover, the court ultimately would be able to create that 
precedent on the vast array of issues that arise in all patent cases, not just 
patent cases that happen to reach one regional appellate court, again 
increasing certainty with respect to substantive patent law.381 
The discussion of certainty in the legislative history did not clearly 
refer to the Federal Circuit’s adjudicatory approach.  That is, proponents 
of the formation of the Federal Circuit did not stress that the new court 
should seek to attain a higher level of certainty in patent law by the type of 
legal tests the court articulated in patent cases.  Thus, the idea that 
Congress sought to further certainty in patent law through the Federal 
Circuit’s adjudicative approach to patent cases may be a misconception.   
Nevertheless, the ability of the Federal Circuit to hear a larger volume 
of cases focused on patent law may as a practical matter result in increased 
rule-based adjudication.  Given its relatively large volume of patent cases, 
Federal Circuit judges may feel inclined to make finer and finer 
distinctions in different circumstances, with the result that patent law 
becomes more defined and, in that sense, more rule-based.  Or perhaps 
                                                                                                                          
380 In the first opinion issued by the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge Markey, on behalf of the en banc 
court, stated: “As a court of nationwide geographic jurisdiction, [the Federal Circuit was] created and 
chartered with the hope and intent that stability and uniformity would be achieved in all fields of law 
within its substantive jurisdiction.”  S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en 
banc) (emphases added); see also Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: 
Challenge and Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 595 (1985) [hereinafter Markey, Challenge and 
Opportunity] (“The challenge to the court and its bar is to create and maintain a uniform, reliable, 
predictable, nationally-applicable body of law in each of the many and varied fields of substantive law 
assigned exclusively to the court.” (emphasis added)).  Thus, some Federal Circuit judges may have 
viewed the court’s creation as insufficient to create the stability and uniformity sought by Congress.  
Indeed, on the Federal Circuit’s tenth anniversary, Chief Judge Markey declared that “the Federal 
Circuit met the desire of its congressional creators for increased uniformity” by identifying and 
resolving “all of the thirteen conflicts in the previous patent law decisions of the regional circuit courts 
and remov[ing] the slogans that for years had barnacled the patent law.”  Howard T. Markey, The 
Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 577 (1992). 
381 This legislative history, and its emphasis on uniformity, is particularly relevant to procedural 
questions that have arisen related to the scope of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction and similar doctrines 
affecting the choice of law.  See generally Holmes Grp., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (addressing the 
scope of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (addressing state sovereign immunity from federal patent law); Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (addressing federal preemption of a state 
statute); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (addressing the scope of the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction).  But increased procedural uniformity—in terms of consolidating 
jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases and creating a unitary set of precedent governing patent law—
inherently increases certainty in substantive patent law. 
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based on the large volume of cases, Federal Circuit judges may feel 
inclined to create more bright-line rules based on a sense that these rules 
would make patent litigation more efficient; they may decide that, based on 
their experience, the vast majority of cases will be decided correctly when 
applying those rules.  Thus, rule-based adjudication may be a natural result 
of increased exposure to any area of law, including patent law.   
Regardless, certainty is not irrelevant as a potential normative guide to 
the development of patent law doctrine.  Far from it.  Consider Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., where the Supreme Court determined that 
vesting judges rather than juries with responsibility for claim construction 
would “promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty 
through the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject 
to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals 
court.”382  In this way the Court distinguished between interjurisdictional 
uniformity (achieved by the creation of the Federal Circuit with its 
virtually-exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases)383 and intrajurisdictional 
certainty (understood to mean predictability obtained through consistent 
application of judicial precedent).  Notably, this justification for the 
Court’s holding, intrajurisdictional certainty, derives not from the 
legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act but from a 
general principle of law (stare decisis) applied in a patent case.  
Nevertheless, the Court adopted a particular bright-line rule in the context 
of an important issue in patent law adjudication—judges would interpret 
patent claims—based in part on the idea of increasing certainty, a goal that 
just so happens to be included expressly in the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act as a justification for the creation of the Federal Circuit. 
Markman thus provides a good example that, while the legislative 
history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act might be seen as providing 
a basis for seeking certainty in patent law, there are other, potentially better 
justifications.  These other justifications reflect the idea that certainty was 
not necessarily attained when the Federal Circuit was created.  Instead, the 
goal of certainty may still be sought through the jurisprudence of the courts 
and, in particular, in the substantive doctrines of patent law, including 
through the adoption of rule-based adjudication.  Indeed, three other bases 
exist, besides the Federal Courts Improvement Act, for invoking the policy 
of certainty when deciding what tests to apply in patent-related cases.  I 
                                                                                                                          
382 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). 
383 The Court indicated that “the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent” also 
impacted how to resolve the question of whether to allocate the task of claim construction to the court 
or jury.  Id. at 390.  It decided that a bright line rule would be appropriate to foster uniformity: the 
judge, not the jury, should construe patent claims.  The Court explained that “[i]t was just for the sake 
of such desirable uniformity that Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an 
exclusive appellate court for patent cases.”  Id. 
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turn to these bases next. 
b.  General Principles of Law 
Judges and commentators sometimes rely upon general principles of 
law to justify rule-based adjudication in patent cases.  As shown, the 
Supreme Court in Markman relied in part upon the doctrine of stare decisis 
and a general desire to increase certainty to justify creation of a bright-line 
rule that claim construction is the exclusive task of the court.  Other 
Supreme Court opinions in patent cases expressly focus on a generalized 
concept of certainty underlying the law to encourage the adoption of rule-
like tests.384  But general principles underlying the law by their very nature 
do not provide any reason to favor rule-based adjudication in patent law 
any more than in other areas of law.   
In this regard, consider Judge O’Malley’s view that the Federal Circuit 
should seek to advance certainty when appropriate—but without adopting 
patent law exceptionalism as the basis for doing so.  She recently remarked 
that “the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that neither the 
character of patent law nor the unusual character of our jurisdiction permits 
us . . . to create special rules for patent cases.”385  She did not stop there, 
however.  In her words, “All of this does not mean that there are no 
vehicles by which we as a court can make affirmative efforts to improve 
uniformity and predictability in patent law.”386  Indeed, she indicated that 
“[t]he uniformity Congress hoped we would bring to the patent system is 
uniformity born of our own adjudicative function.”387  She suggested 
taking specific steps to improve such uniformity and predictability, 
including specific suggestions of potential changes in particular doctrinal 
areas.388  Given her view that the Supreme Court has rejected patent law 
exceptionalism generally389—a broad proposition that, as I discuss below, 
may not be accurate—the basis for her conclusion that predictability may 
still be advanced through the law articulated by the Federal Circuit may 
come from general principles of law. 
                                                                                                                          
384 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65–67 (1998) (concluding that the Federal 
Circuit’s standard-like test for the on-sale bar was improper because it “seriously undermine[d] the 
interest in certainty”); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997) 
(“We leave it to the Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements [to the doctrine of 
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel] to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to 
this area of the law.”). 
385 O’Malley, supra note 376, at 98. 
386 Id. at 99. 
387 Id. at 98 (emphasis added). 
388 Id. at 99. 
389 Id. 
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c.  The Constitution 
Another potential justification for advancing certainty through patent 
law doctrine is the Constitution.  In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc.390—a case addressing patent law that did not pass through the 
Federal Circuit—the Supreme Court identified three sources for the 
importance of uniformity in patent law.391  One of those three sources was 
the Constitution, because the “promot[ion of] national uniformity in the 
realm of intellectual property” is “[o]ne of the fundamental purposes 
behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution.”392  That is, 
because the Constitution gives Congress the power to enact law to promote 
the progress of technology, state law seeking to serve the same ends may 
be preempted.  The result of preemption is nationally uniform law in this 
area.  And the result of a nationally uniform patent law is more certainty as 
compared to a scheme involving conflicting state-law patent regimes and 
potential difficulties identifying which regimes apply to particular conduct. 
Another view of the Patent Clause of the Constitution may provide 
further reason to favor rule-based adjudication in patent law.  The Patent 
Clause is based on a utilitarian, rather than a natural rights, theory of 
property, in that it seeks to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”393  
To the extent that the promotion of progress of technology is better served 
by rules than standards, the Patent Clause may provide reason to favor 
rules.  For example, if potential inventors would be more likely to invest 
time and effort in the inventive process if patent law were more certain, 
rules may be more appropriate.  Whether any particular rule serves the 
utilitarian purposes of patent law better than a standard, however, depends 
on the circumstances of the particular patent law issue.  And this may be 
hotly contested.  As an example, consider Festo, where the Federal Circuit 
judges disputed the need for a bright line rule to govern the scope of the 
doctrine of equivalents based on competing concerns related to incentives 
to invest in both the original development of patentable technology and 
efforts to design around patented technology.394  I will return to Festo 
below.395 
                                                                                                                          
390 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
391 Id. at 162. 
392 Id.  The other two sources included Congress’s decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the 
federal courts and Congress’s decision to confer exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals in the 
Federal Circuit.  Id.  
393 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
394 See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (en banc). 
395 For an extended analysis of the policy-based arguments in favor and against the bright-line 
rule adopted by the Federal Circuit in Festo, see generally Taylor, supra note 29. 
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d.  Patent Law Exceptionalism 
The nature of legal rights in ideas—that is to say the nature of patent 
law itself—may provide another reason to seek certainty in patent law.  In 
this regard, consider again Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.  
There, the Supreme Court explained that the nature of property rights in 
ideas provides another reason for favoring uniformity396—and by 
extension, certainty—in patent law.  Consider the Court’s explanation of 
why this is so: 
Given the inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas, 
and the great power such property has to cause harm to the 
competitive policies which underlay the federal patent laws, 
the demarcation of broad zones of public and private right is 
“the type of regulation that demands a uniform national 
rule.”397 
The Court emphasized the need for a uniform national rule establishing 
a clear dividing line between public and private rights in ideas (1) because 
ideas are inherently ephemeral (consider that it might be better to apply a 
uniform, clear, predictable rule to a vague subject matter than to 
complicate things exponentially by applying a vague standard to vague 
subject matter), and (2) because property rights in ideas may harm 
competition in the marketplace of ideas.  Importantly, in both respects, 
patent law itself may justify more rule-like tests than even traditional 
property law. 
But the ability to identify the law affecting competition in the 
marketplace of ideas is also important, as is having clear and predictable 
rules, because of the desire to encourage investment by rational market 
participants in developing and disclosing new and useful inventions.398  
Indeed, the encouragement of investment in research and development by 
prospective patent applicants is one of the very goals of patent law, and 
bright-line rules may encourage this investment by eliminating or at least 
reducing risk associated with this behavior.  But uniformity, clarity, and 
predictability in patent law may encourage productive activity not only by 
prospective patent applicants, but also by (1) patent owners and their 
licensees, because bright-line rules may encourage them to invest in 
commercialization of inventions that have already been conceived, and (2) 
                                                                                                                          
396 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162–63. 
397 Id. (quoting Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978)). 
398 See Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the Balancing Function of 
Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 83 (1998) (“Reliability of property rules allows market participants to 
be more rational in the choices they make to maximize their personal utility in the 
marketplace . . . . [which is] consistent with the goal of maximizing social welfare through emphasis on 
the individual liberty principle.”). 
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competitors of patent owners and their licenses, because bright-line rules 
may encourage them to engage in design-around activities that may result 
in the development of additional inventions and commercialization of 
technology.  Thus, this basis for invoking certainty as a policy to favor 
rule-based adjudication in patent law has a similar origin as the 
constitutional basis—a utilitarian view of patent law—although it is based 
more on pragmatic policy than any positivist interpretation of any legal 
text.   
Notably, this justification for rule-based adjudication in patent law—
essentially, that patent law inherently favors rule-based adjudication more 
so than other areas of the law—reflects the views of several Federal Circuit 
judges.  Chief Judge Markey, for example, viewed the need to create 
uniformity and certainty in patent law as “unique,” “particular,” and 
“special” to the Federal Circuit.399  In this sense, he seemingly emphasized 
his belief in patent law exceptionalism with respect to rule-based 
adjudication.   
Judge Newman has expressed a general concern with the use of policy-
driven analyses to decide cases.400  Nevertheless, as noted above, she 
repeatedly focuses on the policy of certainty in her opinions.  It is 
noteworthy that her justification for using certainty to inform patent law 
adjudication derives not only from the formation of the Federal Circuit, 
however, but also from the nature of patent law itself.  In the latter regard, 
she has recognized that “[a] principal goal [of those who formed the 
Federal Circuit], the elimination of intercircuit differences, was achieved 
overnight, for after October 1, 1982 there was no other forum.”401  And she 
has highlighted that unification of the law was achieved by (1) the 
selection of the law of the Federal Circuit’s predecessor courts as binding 
precedent and (2) the unification in one appellate court of appellate review 
of patentability decisions made by the Patent Office and judgment of 
district courts deciding patent infringement cases.402  But she has explained 
                                                                                                                          
399 See Markey, Challenge and Opportunity, supra note 380, at 595 (“All courts face similar 
challenges and opportunities, but the unique mission of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
makes the challenge particular and the opportunity special.”). 
400 See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM. U. 
L. REV. 683, 688 (1993) (“I caution against . . . policy-driven activism whereby the application of the 
law will not be known until the Federal Circuit hears the case. . . . It is policy choices that lead to 
departure from precedent, into the judicial activism that weighs against legal stability. . . . [P]olicy 
choices are not the province of judges.”). 
401 Newman, supra note 378, at 524.  The creation of the Federal Circuit solved the forum-
selection problem plaguing patent litigation at the time—the selection of district courts based on the 
governing appellate court and its interpretation of patent law.  But modern patent litigation includes a 
different form of forum-selection—the selection of district courts based on the judges, local procedures 
and local rules, and juries.  See David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 675–76 
(2013) (describing recent attention to forum shopping among various federal district courts). 
402 Newman, supra note 378, at 522–24.  
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why, nevertheless, certainty is an exceptional policy as applied to patent 
law: “Although not all new technologies require the support of a patent in 
order to be economically viable, for those that do the degree of legal 
certainty, as to patentability and enforceability, is a significant factor in 
innovation decisions.”403  Thus, she also favors patent law exceptionalism 
with respect to rule-based adjudication, particularly with respect to the 
issues of patentability and enforceability.  Judge Newman’s willingness to 
endorse bright-line rules based on the goal of increased certainty, however, 
is limited.  In Festo, for example, Judge Newman rejected the majority’s 
reliance on certainty as a basis for adoption of the complete bar to the 
doctrine of equivalents, a bright-line rule.404  In her view, “the optimum 
balance between innovator and imitator in a technology-dependent 
economy involves many considerations.”405  In particular, concerns with 
certainty and clear notice must be balanced with “innovation and 
competition policy.”406  In this regard, Judge Newman’s views seem to 
coincide with Professor Dreyfuss’s views. 
Judge Linn similarly has recognized that “the goal of uniformity was 
achieved procedurally not by years of decisions but by a single act of 
Congress in granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction in 
patent cases.”407  Yet he still sees value in rule-based adjudication in patent 
law.  Indeed, Judge Linn has taken the arguments in favor of rule-based 
adjudication to a new level.  He concedes that “the Supreme Court . . . is 
giving us guidance that promoting uniformity in patent decisions does not 
mean creating patent-specific, bright-line rules outside the mainstream of 
federal law.”408  But significantly, he is willing to push back against this 
guidance.  He argues that “[t]he Federal Circuit deals with decisions 
affecting business leaders who are looking for clear answers and 
unambiguous guidance,” and that ”[b]usiness people like bright-line rules” 
because “[i]t is easier to make business decisions when the implications 
and consequences of those decisions are well known.”409  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court’s reticence to endorse bright-line rules “gives [Judge Linn] 
some reason to be concerned about future Supreme Court decisions that 
                                                                                                                          
403 Newman, supra note 378, at 515. 
404 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 634 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
405 Id. at 636. 
406 Id. at 638–41. 
407 Linn, supra note 378, at 735. 
408 Richard Linn, Changing Times: Changing Demands, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2011); see also id. (“[A] consistent theme of the Court’s opinions is the continual endorsement of past 
Supreme Court patent opinions and condemnation of patent-specific, bright-line rules in favor of 
flexible mainstream dogma.”). 
409 Id. at 7; see also id. (“We see this in the disputes that come before us day-in and day-out and in 
the regular exchanges we have with the patent bar, including with members in both private practice and 
in-house.”). 
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may overlook the importance of, and the need for, more specific 
guidance.”410  Like Judge Newman, however, Judge Linn’s willingness to 
endorse bright-line rules is limited.  In the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Festo, he also rejected the bright-line rule advanced by the majority—the 
complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents—based on his view that the 
majority was unable to justify such a “dramatic policy shift.”411  In this 
way, Judge Linn has also expressed a preference for patent law 
exceptionalism favoring bright-line rules, but only when the relevant 
policies support their application. 
Former Chief Judge Michel likewise has stressed predictability as 
particularly important in patent law.412  Furthermore, like Judge Linn, he 
has expressly tied predictability to rule-based adjudication.  In his words, 
“If the parties to [patent] disputes . . . are able to ascertain their rights and 
obligations prior to litigation by applying rules set forth in precedent, they 
can alter their behavior accordingly.”413  He has discounted the importance 
of fairness compared to predictability in patent law.414  And, more 
generally, he has stressed that uncertainty creates more lawsuits, “an 
undesirable and ultimately an unsustainable result.”415  Like Judges 
Newman and Linn, however, Judge Michel rejected the rigid rule of the 
complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents in Festo because he believed it 
“contradict[ed] Supreme Court precedent and policy.”416  Nevertheless, it 
is somewhat remarkable that three of the four judges dissenting from the 
adoption of the rigid rule of the complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents 
in Festo have elsewhere expressed strong support for rule-based 
adjudication in patent law.  
Judge Plager, who was among the majority in Festo,417 similarly has 
expressed his concern that there is an “endemic problem of uncertainty in 
law and the judicial decisional process, and particularly in patent law.”418  
Indeed, he admits that he has “had long-standing concerns with the 
                                                                                                                          
410 Id.; see also id. (“The Supreme Court, on the other hand, deals with legal principles and the 
policy implications they engender.  The Supreme Court is more accustomed to making general rules 
that can be applied on a case-by-case basis to the facts and circumstances as they arise.  For the 
Supreme Court, bright-line rules are seldom endorsed.  This difference in perspective may account for 
some of the recent differences in the decisions of the respective courts . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
411 Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 620 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
412 See Michel, supra note 373, at 1233–34 (identifying patent litigation, in particular, as the area 
of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in which predictability is most important). 
413 Id. at 1234. 
414 See id. (“Some observers, however, might argue that the costs of less predictability are 
justified by the benefits of greater fairness.”). 
415 Id. at 1235. 
416 Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 598 (Michel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
417 Id. at 562. 
418 S. Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: On Uncertainty and Policy Levers, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 749, 749 (2010). 
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problem of indeterminacy in legal doctrine, especially in patent law.”419  
Then, after summarizing Professor Mullally’s article discussing a general 
framework for addressing uncertainty in patent law specifically,420 he 
proceeds to explain how uncertainty in one particular doctrinal area of 
patent law, claim construction, could be addressed.421 
These Federal Circuit judges have indicated that certainty provides 
unique incentives to favor rules in patent law—but they have repeatedly 
said so in law review articles and speeches rather than in judicial opinions.  
In terms of judicial decisions, only a handful address the issue.  One of the 
most detailed Federal Circuit opinions addressing whether patent law 
should favor rule-based adjudication is the court’s decision in Festo itself.  
There, the en banc Federal Circuit justified its decision to adopt a complete 
bar to the doctrine of equivalents, rather than a flexible bar, by explaining 
that the promotion of certainty in patent law “cannot help but be frustrated 
by the uncertainty inherent in the flexible bar approach.”422  According to 
the court, the complete bar, in contrast to the flexible bar, would create 
certainty.423  “This certainty will stimulate investment in improvements and 
design-arounds because the risk of infringement will be easier to 
determine.”424  Moreover, “the difficulty in counseling the public and the 
patentee on the scope of protection provided by an amended element is 
greatly reduced under the complete bar approach due to the certainty and 
predictability such a bar produces.”425  While the Supreme Court vacated 
the Federal Circuit’s judgment primarily because it conflicted with 
Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit’s opinion nevertheless 
makes strong arguments in favor of rule-based adjudication in this area of 
patent law.  Moreover, as Professor Thomas has recognized, even after the 
Supreme Court’s decision to vacate the judgment, the law governing the 
doctrine of equivalents has become more rule-like.426 
As the Supreme Court stressed in reversing the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Festo, however, patent law’s need for certainty does not justify 
the use of a rigid rule in every instance.427  The need may be met by 
                                                                                                                          
419 Id. at 754. 
420 See id. at 754–56 (citing and generally discussing Mullally, supra note 372). 
421 See id. Part II.B (discussing various works that address issues of claim construction). 
422 Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 575. 
423 Id. at 577. 
424 Id. 
425 Id. at 577–78. 
426 See Thomas, supra note 16, at 786 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision largely vindicates 
increasingly restrictive Federal Circuit practices regarding the doctrine of equivalents.  The Supreme 
Court left only three slender opportunities for overcoming prosecution history estoppel . . . .”). 
427 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 735, 739 (2002) 
(“The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson . . . [in which the petitioner] 
requested another bright-line rule that would have provided more certainty in determining when 
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particular patent law doctrines, such as the definiteness requirement, such 
that other doctrines need not utilize rule-like tests.  Or the need for 
certainty may be sufficiently taken into account by particular conceptions 
of patent law doctrines, like prosecution history estoppel, without resort to 
rule-like tests governing those doctrines.428  Thus, the desire for certainty 
in patent law does not necessarily justify rule-based adjudication in every 
instance. 
In addition to the Federal Circuit judges, Professor Golden has focused 
on the uniqueness of patent law as possible support for rule-based 
adjudication.  He has explained that the Federal Circuit’s “formal 
rules . . . whatever their faults, appear intended to promote goals of 
certainty, predictability, and fidelity to recent directions from the Supreme 
Court.”429  As to the source of these goals, he cites the history of the 
legislation that created the Federal Circuit.430  But he also cites the view 
that certainty and predictability in patent law are “particularly important to 
private planning and commerce.”431  Indeed, “a certainty-promoting 
jurisprudence might be understood as . . . supporting ‘a relatively robust’ 
patent system in which commercial actors will invest.”432   
Professor Dreyfuss has recognized both that predictability is a “value 
that the [patent] industry holds in high esteem”433 and that the Federal 
Circuit’s success in increasing predictability “has very much pleased the 
patent industries.”434  Indeed, one particular practitioner who played a role 
in the formation of the Federal Circuit, Donald Dunner, has explained that, 
in his view, the Federal Circuit “has used bright-line rules to create 
uniformity, and where not necessary, it’s used flexible rules.”435  But while 
he thinks the Federal Circuit “has done remarkably well in achieving 
uniformity”436 by resolving conflicts in patent law that existed among the 
regional circuits, he laments that his ability to “predict the outcome of a 
Federal Circuit case has been diminished very significantly.”437 
                                                                                                                          
estoppel applies but at the cost of disrupting the expectations of countless existing patent holders.  We 
rejected that approach . . . .”). 
428 See id. at 727, 739 (acknowledging that competitors may rely on prosecution history estoppel 
to reduce uncertainty while rejecting use of a bright line rule). 
429 Golden, supra note 11, at 681. 
430 Id. at 719 n.364 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981)). 
431 Id. at 687. 
432 Id. at 685 (citing Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the 
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 314 (2007)). 
433 Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 792. 
434 Id. at 798. 
435 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit 20th Anniversary Judicial Conference, 217 F.R.D. 
548, 562 (2002). 
436 Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
437 Id. at 561 (emphasis added).  Mr. Dunner’s views highlight that, while uniformity increases 
certainty, it does not necessarily result in perfect certainty.  The uniform law developed by the Federal 
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Professor Dreyfuss has emphasized that the predictability of patent law 
is “especially prized” because those subject to patent law’s constraints 
“base their decisions to invest in innovation upon their expectations of 
achieving patent protection.”438  Her point, of course, focuses on potential 
patent applicants.  She highlights that potential innovators are potential 
patent applicants, and she suggests that they decide whether to engage in 
the potentially risky behavior of attempted innovation based less on the 
accuracy of patentability determinations by the Patent Office and courts 
than on the predictability of those determinations.439  Professor Dreyfuss 
does not cite any empirical support for this proposition, but instead relies 
upon intuition.  Quoting Judge Henry Friendly, she suggests that 
businesspeople plan their activities with an eye toward the law governing 
patentability, in contrast with criminals who “do not plan their activity with 
an eye fixed on the Bill of Rights, the Federal Penal Code, or the rules of 
evidence applicable in criminal trials.”440  To assist businesspeople, 
Professor Dreyfuss suggests that legal rules may be helpful.  And she 
suggests that a specialized court may be better than a generalized court to 
craft these legal rules.  She summarizes these points succinctly by stating 
that “actors who make decisions in reliance on legal rules benefit more 
from specialization than do . . . actors who look primarily to the law’s 
compensatory aspects.”441 
Professor Dreyfuss’s point may be expanded to cover the broader 
group of potential innovators I have already mentioned, in particular those 
contemplating the ability to avoid infringing others’ patents.  In this 
context as well, intuition seems to indicate that potential innovators would 
prefer predictability over accuracy.  Of course there are various other legal 
doctrines about which potential innovators surely also care.  For example, 
potential innovators no doubt care about remedies, including both damages 
calculations and injunctive relief. 
There are, of course, competing views and concerns.  Chief Judge 
Young from the District of Massachusetts, for example, has harshly 
criticized the Federal Circuit for its “careful delineation of ever more 
                                                                                                                          
Circuit and the Supreme Court may or may not be predictable; that is one of many challenges 
confronting the courts. 
438 Dreyfuss, supra note 183, at 419. 
439 Id.  In this regard, note that the potential patent applicant is perfectly happy with an inaccurate 
determination that its innovation is patentable even if the “right” determination is that its innovation is 
not patentable.  The potential patent applicant is never happy if its prediction regarding patentability is 
incorrect.  In that situation, the potential patent applicant has either wasted its effort in attempting to 
secure a patent (and potentially invested money in research and development that will not provide any 
return on its investment given the lack of a patent), or not engaged in the research and development in 
the first place when a patent could have been obtained on the invention. 
440 Id. at 420 n.182 (quoting Henry Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 634, 639 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
441 Id. at 420. 
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explicit and detailed rules, a ‘patent code,’ if you will.”442  He blames the 
fact that, “[u]nlike the other circuit courts of appeal, the Federal Circuit 
came into being, in part, pursuant to an express Congressional mandate to 
foster uniformity in the application of the law of patents.”443  Highlighting 
the Federal Circuit’s insistence on creating a bright-line rule in Festo, 
Judge Young contrasts the Federal Circuit’s perceived mandate with the 
mandate of every district court—litigation on a case-by-case basis with a 
special role for juries to decide disputes.444  In Judge Young’s words, it is a 
“[s]mall wonder, then, that intellectual tension exists as the [Federal 
Circuit] struggles to impose its vision and to shape the views of those 
courts that rightly consider themselves the prime guardians of the most 
vital expression of direct democracy in America today—the jury of the 
people.”445   
Thus, Judge Young rejects the Federal Circuit’s preference for bright-
line rules in view of two general principles: (1) that the law should provide 
flexibility to judges to handle matters on a case-by-case basis; and (2) that 
legal issues should be submitted to juries rather than decided by judges 
based on bright-line rules.446  What all of this highlights is that, to the 
extent that any argument is made in favor of rule-based adjudication based 
on notions of uniformity and certainty derived from patent exceptionalism, 
that argument must overcome these general principles of law and others 
like them.  Indeed, it seems appropriate to place the burden of persuasion 
on the proponent of rule-based adjudication. 
2.  The Impact of Policies Supporting Rule-Based Adjudication on 
Particular Patent Law Doctrines 
At the heart of the fourth basis for invoking certainty to justify rule-
based adjudication in patent law is the question whether patent law really is 
exceptional, that is whether it is so unique that it should be treated 
differently than other areas of the law.447  One argument in favor of patent 
law exceptionalism hinges on property law exceptionalism.  A patent right 
is a property right, so the argument goes, and property rights are 
exceptional compared to other areas of the law in the sense that bright-line 
                                                                                                                          
442 Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D. Mass. 2001). 
443 Id. at 123. 
444 Id. at 124–25. 
445 Id. 
446 Id. at 124. 
447 For an analysis of patent law exceptionalism as compared to antitrust law, see C. Scott 
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1597–604 (2006).  For a retort to arguments that patent law is by its very nature 
exceptional, see Liivak, supra note 288, at 1169–73. 
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rules are necessary to spur investment in property.448  Indeed, as Professor 
Kennedy has noted, “[T]he first self-conscious general statement of 
principles for the choice of form, at least by an American, is [Professor 
Roscoe] Pound’s Theory of Judicial Decision, published in 1923.”449  
Professor Pound’s thesis was that “rules of law . . . which are applied 
mechanically are more adapted to property and to business transactions; 
standards where application proceeds upon intuition are more adapted to 
human conduct and to the conduct of enterprises.”450   
If Pound was correct, then the relevant question is whether patent 
law—or, more precisely, issues raised in patent law—are more like 
“property and . . . business transactions” or “human conduct and . . . the 
conduct of enterprises.”451  These categories are rather vague and, anyway, 
it could be argued that patent law fits within both categories in different 
circumstances.  But the underlying reason for distinguishing between these 
categories is that decision making regarding property and business 
transactions is made ex ante in the view of the law, and therefore the law 
should be identifiable, clear, and predictable to encourage optimal 
investments in property and other business transactions.  Other forms of 
human conduct may not involve making ex ante decisions based on 
assessments of risk and cost.  Examples include potentially criminal or 
tortious behavior by individuals and enterprises.452   
Applied to patent law, the question is whether, ex ante, patent 
applicants, patent owners, and potential infringers consider risks and costs 
associated with their technology-based activities, and whether they would 
invest more heavily in these activities if the risk and cost could be reduced 
by the adoption of more formal, rule-like tests governing the relevant 
aspects of patent law.  It seems apparent that rational patent applicants, 
patent owners, and potential infringers would consider these risks and costs 
                                                                                                                          
448 See Liivak, supra note 288, at 1167–68 (“Building a patent narrative around traditional 
property is a revolutionary step forward.”); see also id. at 1182 (“[T]he genius of a property rights 
system is that it relies on . . . judicial discretion as little as possible.” (quoting JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 222 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  This 
argument must overcome significant differences between patent rights and real property rights, 
including the ephemeral and non-rivalrous nature of ideas.  See id. (“[T]raditional property deals with 
scarce, rival resources . . . . Nonrival ideas that are at the heart of patent law just do not seem to fit.”).  
449 Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1702. 
450 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, III, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
451 Pound, supra note 450, at 951. 
452 That is not to say that there are not other reasons to favor bright-line rules to govern even these 
areas of law.  In criminal law, for example, the fact that legal tests will be applied by law enforcement 
personnel provides an independent basis to favor bright-line rules in some circumstances.  See, e.g., 
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1045 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating that a “clear 
rule simplifies the task of officers who encounter occupants during a search”).  Identifying the legal 
decision-maker and determining whether to constrain their discretion are important factors in 
considering rule-based adjudication, a topic that I address next. 
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in advance if they had access to this information, and that they would 
invest more heavily in their activities if that risk and cost could be reduced.  
Whether these parties act rationally and whether this information is freely 
available is another, perhaps intractable question. 
Another approach centers around answering the question of whether a 
rule would be helpful to narrow options available to the relevant legal 
decision-makers.  As Professor Frederick Schauer has explained, 
“Formalism . . . achieves its value when it is thought desirable to narrow 
the decisional opportunities and the decisional range of a certain class of 
decisionmakers.”453  In the context of patent law, relevant potential 
decision-makers include patent examiners, juries, and judges.  To the 
extent that their decisions can be made more predictable, then patent 
applicants, patent owners, and potential infringers may discount the cost 
associated with risk and invest more heavily in productive activities.454  
Identifying the decision-makers related to specific patent law doctrines, 
then, may go a long way towards identifying whether certainty (in both its 
forms of clarity and predictability) deserves substantial weight in the 
formation of governing legal tests.  The ultimate question using this 
approach, then, is whether particular decision-makers should be given 
discretion or have their discretion constrained. 
Within patent law, decision making sometimes is exclusive to one 
decision-maker, but more often is nonexclusive.  Patent examiners 
consider only issues concerning patent eligibility and validity; they do not 
consider issues of infringement, damages, or injunctions.  Juries consider 
questions of fact, some of which overlap with the purview of patent 
examiners, like invalidity by anticipation, and some of which do not, like 
infringement and damages.  Juries may also give advisory verdicts on 
questions of law that are based on subsidiary questions of fact, like 
obviousness, but they do not consider other questions of law, such as claim 
construction and injunctive relief.  Judges at one point or another may 
consider every issue raised in a patent case, particularly in view of the 
ability to consider motions for summary judgment and judgment as a 
matter of law, but they have final decision-making power only on issues 
that ultimately are questions of law, like claim construction, obviousness, 
and injunctive relief. 
Juries, the proverbial black box, of course are notorious for 
unpredictability.  The average juror likely has little experience with 
technology generally, let alone the technology raised in a particular patent 
case.  Presumably he or she lacks any knowledge of the governing law, and 
patent law is extraordinarily complex as shown by the long and detailed 
                                                                                                                          
453 Schauer, supra note 49, at 544. 
454 See, e.g., Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1737, 1740–41 (2011) (describing costs to potential infringers of ambiguous patent claims). 
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model jury instructions provided for use in patent cases.455  As a result, at 
least based on this mode of analysis, patent law issues decided by juries are 
prime targets for rule-based tests.   
Likewise, very few judges have technical degrees or backgrounds, let 
alone technical knowledge matching the field of particular patent cases.  
This lack of technical knowledge is compounded to the extent a judge has 
little experience with patent cases and therefore less knowledge of the 
governing law.  Moreover, if Justice Scalia is correct, “[f]ederal judges . . . 
are not interested in . . . getting into the weeds of patent law.”456  And there 
is reason to think that he is correct.457  The judges of the Federal Circuit 
and the district court judges electing to participate in the Patent Pilot 
Program may be some of the only exceptions.  Regardless, when these 
concerns exist, courts have a better basis to consider the appropriateness of 
rule-based tests for patent law issues decided by judges. 
It is not surprising that rule-based adjudication may seem appropriate 
for decision making by juries and some judges in patent cases, at least to 
the extent these cases involve highly complex, technical subject matter.  
Professor Lee has explained that one of the purposes and effects of rule-
based adjudication in patent law is to reduce the need to engage in the 
difficult task of sorting through complex technical information.458  To the 
extent that he is correct, his analysis applies specifically to juries and 
courts but less so to patent examiners given their technical expertise.459  
Taken to its extreme, however, this justification for the use of rule-based 
adjudication—a need to constrain the decision-making power of juries and 
judges—creates the problem highlighted by Professor Rai where the 
Federal Circuit decides factual matters in patent cases using the de novo 
                                                                                                                          
455 See, e.g., THE NAT’L JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
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456 Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No. 11-1118). 
457 See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
387, 388 & n.3 (describing “traditional judicial disenchantment with patent cases” and citing statements 
by past Supreme Court Justices). 
458 Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 4–7. 
459 Given Professor Lee’s analysis, it is somewhat ironic that the Federal Circuit favors reducing 
engagement with complex technical information, but the Supreme Court does not.  See id. at 41 
(explaining that the Federal Circuit adheres to “formalistic jurisprudence,” which allows for less 
familiarity with technical knowledge); id. at 42 (suggesting that the Supreme Court has adopted a 
“holistic” approach, which “will increase technological engagement”).  The Federal Circuit—which, 
based on its exclusive jurisdiction, has the most experience dealing with cases involving complex 
technical information and therefore might be most comfortable with complex technical information—
appears to discount the ability of district court judges to sort through complex technical information. 
But the Supreme Court—which has the least experience dealing with these cases and therefore 
presumably is least comfortable with complex technical information—does not. 
 484 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:415 
standard of review.460  That is, the decision-making power of juries and 
judges is constrained the most when an issue is determined to be a matter 
of law subject to de novo review by the Federal Circuit. 
To the extent that an issue requires a decision by a patent examiner, 
this mode of analysis may still allow for a rule-like test.  The reason, 
however, is not an inability to understand complex technical subject 
matter, but the possibility of inconsistent applications of patent law.  
Inconsistency may result from the sheer number of patent examiners,461 the 
probability that patent examiners have varying knowledge of the governing 
law,462 and the lack of incentives on patent examiners to use any discretion 
provided by the law evenhandedly in an ex parte proceeding.  Thus, given 
the various concerns with respect to all three types of potential decision-
makers in the field of patent law, there is good reason at least to consider 
the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication for particular patent law 
issues. 
When legal issues in patent cases are determined multiple times by 
multiple decision-makers, moreover, rule-based adjudication may be 
particularly appropriate.  Consider patentability issues.  Any decision 
regarding patentability by a patent examiner is subject to reconsideration 
by juries, judges, or both, either in a direct appeal or in a collateral 
challenge in a patent infringement lawsuit.  An example is the novelty 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102.463  The fulfillment of this requirement is 
potentially presented to patent examiners, juries, and judges.  In this 
regard, note that, as discussed above, the Supreme Court moved patent law 
toward a rule-based test in Pfaff based on a concern with the uncertainty of 
the Federal Circuit’s totality-of-the circumstances test.464   
Now consider claim construction.  The meaning of claim language is a 
central concern in patent litigation because it affects the vast majority of 
other legal issues that arise in patent cases.  Indeed, the meaning of the 
claim language affects all issues of patentability (eligibility, novelty, 
barring activities, non-obviousness, and disclosure requirements) and 
infringement.  Thus, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court in Markman 
confirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision that judges, rather than juries, 
should determine the meaning of claim language given concerns with 
                                                                                                                          
460 See Rai, supra note 16, at 1042–65 (describing the Federal Circuit as “arrogat[ing] power over 
factual questions”). 
461 The Patent Office employs several thousand patent examiners.  Patent Examiner Positions, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Aug. 
25, 2013). 
462 Patent examiners need not be law school graduates.  See id. (listing qualification 
requirements). 
463 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 2011). 
464 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65–66 & n.11 (1998); see supra Part IV.B.2.a. 
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uniformity and certainty.465 
Not only is the identity of the decision-maker a key component 
regarding the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication in patent cases, 
but the nature of the legal question is also critically important.  To the 
extent the legal question depends on potentially subjective views of 
circumstances, the legal question may be better suited for a rule-based test.  
Primary examples include the non-obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a) and the doctrine of equivalents.466  In this regard, note the tension 
between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court with respect to the 
extent to which the governing law should reflect the policy of certainty.  In 
KSR the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of 
the TSM test as a component of the non-obviousness analysis.467  The 
Federal Circuit’s test provided more certainty. The Supreme Court, 
however, tempered the doctrine, injecting it with more flexibility, yet 
nevertheless still accepting the usefulness of identifying a reason to 
combine the prior art before reaching a conclusion of obviousness.468  
Likewise, in Festo the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions 
display contrary views of the importance of certainty in formulating a test 
for constraining application of the doctrine of equivalents using 
prosecution history estoppel.469 
In short, given the nature of patent law and the importance of certainty 
to patent applicants, patentees, and potential infringers, there is reason to 
consider whether rule-based adjudication may be appropriate in particular 
circumstances with respect to particular patent law doctrines.  The 
resolution of whether rule-based adjudication is appropriate with respect to 
specific patent-law doctrines is beyond the scope of this Article.  But this 
Article has presented a framework for considering the degree to which 
rule-based adjudication might be appropriate in any circumstance.  The 
appropriate adjudicatory approach depends on the extent to which the 
doctrine in question should reflect the goal of certainty, and to what extent 
it should reflect other goals including flexibility, fairness, and justice.  In 
making these determinations, the identity of the decision-makers and the 
nature of the legal question are important variables in the analysis.  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                          
465 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).  The Federal Circuit is 
currently considering the question of whether it should review district court claim constructions with 
deference.  See generally Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 Fed. 
App’x. 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (granting rehearing en banc). 
466 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (non-obviousness); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (doctrine of equivalents). 
467 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). 
468 Id. at 418. 
469 Compare Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 569 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (suggesting that prosecution history estoppel is a complete bar to the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents), with Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 737–38 (2002) (adopting a flexible bar approach 
when analyzing prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents). 
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it is important to consider the underlying goals sought to be achieved by 
the legal question, the level of confidence in the ability of a rule or a 
standard to achieve the identified underlying goals, and the level of 
confidence in the ability of the decision-makers who might be called upon 
to enforce the rule or standard. 
B.  The Roles of the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit with Respect to 
Rule-Based Adjudication 
Given the reasons for the Federal Circuit to increase certainty in patent 
law, the next normative inquiry asks how the Federal Circuit should do so, 
and how the Supreme Court should review the Federal Circuit’s decisions 
seeking to increase certainty. 
1.  The Federal Circuit’s Role 
It is the Federal Circuit’s role, in the first instance, to consider the 
appropriateness of rule-based adjudication, to adopt it when appropriate 
based on the court’s analysis of the need for certainty, and to provide a 
well-reasoned and well-documented explanation of that analysis for review 
by the litigants, the patent bar, and the Supreme Court.  It is the Supreme 
Court’s role, in turn, to question the appropriateness of rule-based 
adjudication when it is adopted by the Federal Circuit, to reject it when it is 
not appropriate based on its own analysis of the need for certainty, and to 
provide helpful explanations of its decisions to reject rule-based 
adjudication in favor of standard-based adjudication.  In this way, the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court may engage in a dialogue 
concerning the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication in patent law 
and, ultimately, reach a balanced approach to the law that takes into 
account the goal of certainty—which as discussed above exists generally in 
the law but may have more importance in patent law—as well as the 
countervailing interests in flexibility and accuracy.   
a.  Practicing Humility Through Detailed Self-Examination 
There are certain things the Federal Circuit can and should do to 
ensure that patent law is not burdened by excessive rule-based 
adjudication.  First, the Federal Circuit should practice humility through 
detailed self-examination of its law favoring rule-like tests.  In this regard, 
the Federal Circuit’s opinions to date often include little discussion of the 
underlying policies driving the court’s decisions.  Indeed, judges at the 
Federal Circuit have indicated that, as a general rule, they purposefully 
avoid including policy discussion in their opinions.470  To the extent a 
                                                                                                                          
470 See Newman, supra note 400, at 688 (describing reasons for refraining from addressing policy 
in judicial opinions); Plager & Pettigrew, supra note 26, at 1750–52 (same); see also O’Malley, supra 
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general rule of avoiding policy discussion is appropriate, discussion of 
certainty should be an exception.  That is, Federal Circuit judges should 
expressly note instances in which they believe the interest of certainty 
justifies rule-like tests in patent law.  In other words, they should explain 
why the use of rules over standards is justified by the interest in achieving 
certainty.  To omit this policy-based reasoning is to invite the Supreme 
Court to discount the importance of certainty—and given its lack of 
experience in patent cases, the Court may not appreciate the value of that 
certainty in particular circumstances.  Once the Federal Circuit includes 
this policy-based analysis, it will begin the process of engaging the 
Supreme Court in a dialogue regarding the appropriateness of rule-based 
adjudication in patent law. 
Until relatively recently the two courts had not engaged in that 
dialogue very often.  As discussed above, the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Festo provides an example of express consideration of certainty as a 
potential justification for rule-based adjudication on the issue of the 
doctrine of equivalents.471  Another example, albeit an awkward one, 
occurred after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in KSR to consider the 
requirement of non-obviousness but before the Supreme Court’s oral 
argument.  During that time period, the Federal Circuit issued several 
opinions explaining how the TSM requirement was a flexible rather than 
an overly rigid rule and, anyway, appropriate because it advanced the 
policy of predictability.472  In the end, the Supreme Court took note of 
these opinions,473 and, to some degree, agreed with the Federal Circuit by 
holding that, “[o]ften, it will be necessary for a court . . . to determine 
whether there was an apparent reason to combine . . . known elements in 
the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.”474   
                                                                                                                          
note 376, at 98 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that neither the character of patent 
law nor the unusual character of our jurisdiction permits us to don a policy-making mantle or to create 
special rules for patent cases.”). 
471 See supra Part V.A.1.d (discussing the Festo decision in relation to the doctrine of 
equivalents). 
472 See, e.g., DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“Our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only permits, but requires, 
consideration of common knowledge and common sense.”); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 
1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence because a 
motivation may be found implicitly in the prior art.  We do not have a rigid test that requires an actual 
teaching to combine . . . . In conclusion, our approach has permitted us to continue to address an issue 
of law not readily amenable to bright-line rules, as we recall and are guided by the wisdom of the 
Supreme Court in striving for a ‘practical test of patentability.’” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966))); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Board must provide 
some rationale, articulation, or reasoned basis to explain why the conclusion of obviousness is correct. 
The requirement of such an explanation is consistent with governing obviousness law, and helps ensure 
predictable patentability determinations.” (citation omitted)). 
473 KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418, 421. 
474 Id. at 418 (emphasis added). 
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Today, the balance between the Supreme Court’s preference for 
standard-based adjudication and the Federal Circuit’s preference for rule-
based adjudication is playing out in the context of the Supreme Court’s 
continued review of Federal Circuit decisions regarding the law governing 
patent eligibility.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently addressed all 
three of the judicially-created exceptions to patent eligibility.  In Bilski, the 
Court addressed the exception for abstract ideas.475  In Mayo, it addressed 
the exception for laws of nature.476  And in Myriad, it effectively addressed 
the exception for physical phenomena, although the court described the 
exception as the one for laws of nature.477  Only in Myriad did the Court 
provide any rule-like test, applying a “rule against patents on naturally 
occurring things.”478  
In Bilski, the Supreme Court failed to identify any guidelines for 
analyzing the patent eligibility of alleged abstract ideas.479  Likewise, in 
Mayo, the Court provided only vague pronouncements concerning the 
appropriate test for determining patent eligibility of applications of natural 
laws.480  Those pronouncements not only seemingly contradict prior 
Supreme Court precedent directly on point,481 but also seemingly combine 
the concepts of patent eligibility, enablement, novelty, and non-
obviousness into one unwieldy test;482 invite subjective decision making; 
and thus fail to provide any real constraint on the discretion of examiners 
and courts considering patent eligibility.  In view of these developments, 
the Federal Circuit has noted that the lack of direction for fact-finders has 
                                                                                                                          
475 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221–22 (2010) (ruling that a method of hedging risk in 
commodities trading falls under the abstract idea exception). 
476 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (ruling 
that a method for calibrating the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs falls under the law of nature 
exception). 
477 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117–18 (2013) 
(evaluating whether a patent covering a sequence of human genes falls under the law of nature 
exception). 
478 Id. at 2116. 
479 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230–31 (relying on an analysis of prior cases rather than application 
of particular factors when deciding what constitutes an abstract idea). 
480 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (referring to conditions that must be 
satisfied in order to transform “unpatentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those 
laws”). 
481 Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or 
steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject 
matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”), with Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (“[T]he Court’s precedents . . . . insist that a process that 
focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination of elements, 
sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts 
to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.” (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 
594 (1978))). 
482 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1303–04. 
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caused “great uncertainty.”483  As a result, it has advocated the extreme 
solution of avoiding the law governing patent eligibility to “bring a degree 
of certainty to the interests of both patentees and their competitors in the 
marketplace.”484  The court also recently attempted—but failed, badly—to 
speak as one voice on the issue of eligibility of computer-related 
inventions to provide the certainty so many of its judges desire.485 
While Professor Duffy has argued that any effort to define rules for 
patent eligibility is destined for failure,486 again an appropriate question to 
ask is what degree of formalism is appropriate in this context.  If rules and 
standards lie on the extreme ends of a continuum, then one still might 
attempt to select the appropriate location on the continuum between rule-
based adjudication and standard-based adjudication.  Indeed, a debate over 
the need for certainty within the Federal Circuit and between the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court on patent eligibility and other doctrines 
would be healthy.   
Similarly, while some might argue that the increasing number and 
proportion of cases in the last decade where the Supreme Court rejected 
Federal Circuit tests as overly rule-bound indicates that there is a problem, 
                                                                                                                          
483 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated, 484 Fed. 
App’x. 559 (per curiam) (granting rehearing en banc). 
484 See MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts could 
avoid the swamp of verbiage that is § 101 by exercising their inherent power to control the processes of 
litigation, and insist that litigants initially address patent invalidity issues in terms of the conditions of 
patentability defenses as the statute provides, specifically §§ 102, 103, and 112.  If that were done in 
the typical patent case, litigation over the question of validity of the patent would be concluded under 
these provisions, and it would be unnecessary to enter the murky morass that is § 101 jurisprudence.  
This would make patent litigation more efficient, conserve judicial resources, and bring a degree of 
certainty to the interests of both patentees and their competitors in the marketplace.” (citation omitted)).  
Not all Federal Circuit judges agree, however.  In Judge Mayer’s view, “[t]he issue of whether a 
claimed method meets the subject matter eligibility requirements contained in 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an 
‘antecedent question’ that must be addressed before this court can consider whether particular claims 
are invalid as obvious or anticipated.”  Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citing In re Comiskey, 554 
F.3d 967, 975 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
485 See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (affirming the district court’s holding, by a majority vote but without a controlling opinion, that 
“asserted method and computer-readable media claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under 
35 U.S.C. § 101,” and affirming the district court’s holding, by an equally divided court, that “the 
asserted system claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under the statute”); see also id. at 
1321 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The ascendance of section 101 as an independent source of litigation, 
separate from the merits of patentability, is a new uncertainty for inventors.  The court, now rehearing 
this case en banc, hoped to ameliorate this uncertainty by providing objective standards for section 101 
patent-eligibility.  Instead we have propounded at least three incompatible standards, devoid of 
consensus, serving simply to add to the unreliability and cost of the system of patents as an incentive 
for innovation.”); id. at 1335 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections) (“I enjoy good writing and a good 
mystery, but I doubt that innovation is promoted when subjective and empty words like ‘contribution’ 
or ‘inventiveness’ are offered up by the courts to determine investment, resource allocation, and 
business decisions.”). 
486 See Duffy, supra note 64, at 614 (arguing that rules defining patent eligibility always fail in the 
long run because the innovation that spurs changing circumstances renders existing rules obsolete). 
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this actually indicates the institutional system is functioning correctly.  It is 
the role of a generalist court of last resort to view rule-based adjudication 
by a more specialized court with suspicion and, in the absence of well-
reasoned justification for rule-based adjudication, to overturn the rule-
based test created by the more specialized court.  And if the court of last 
resort lacks sufficient expertise to provide an independent analysis of the 
benefits and costs associated with rule-based adjudication as applied to a 
particular doctrine, all it can and should do is review the reasoning of the 
more specialized court’s evaluation and reject that reasoning when it is not 
persuaded.   
The burden on the Federal Circuit to explain its basis for favoring rule-
based adjudication is particularly high when it reverses its own precedent 
in favor of rule-based adjudication.  This is because the certainty that is 
advanced by the general legal principle of stare decisis weighs against 
reversing precedent, and so any certainty gained by advancing a rule-like 
test must exceed the uncertainty created by changing the law.  This is 
exactly the situation that confronted the Federal Circuit in Festo, given that 
it was enforcing a radical change in the law governing the doctrine of 
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel, and so in its opinion it 
provided a detailed explanation of the importance of certainty in the 
context of questions of infringement.487  But even when the Federal Circuit 
sustains rule-based adjudication based on its own precedent, its 
predecessor court’s precedent, or even the Supreme Court’s precedent, the 
Federal Circuit should consider providing a detailed and well-reasoned 
justification so that the Supreme Court may serve its own role in the 
present institutional system by analyzing the strength of that justification. 
Indeed, the need to provide detailed and well-reasoned justification for 
rule-based adjudication may be most pronounced where rule-based 
adjudication would run contrary to general principles of law drawn from 
non-patent cases, that is, instances of rule-based patent law exceptionalism.  
In other words, the Federal Circuit should provide detailed and well-
reasoned justification for patent law to differ from the rest of the law with 
respect to the choice between rule-based adjudication and standard-based 
adjudication.  There may be reasons for doing so, including the difficulty 
of legal decision-makers to engage in standard-based adjudication and 
associated concerns with costs imposed on patent applicants, patentees, 
and potential infringers.  But, whatever the reasons, the Federal Circuit 
should clearly identify them and provide a well-reasoned, policy-based 
explanation—despite judges’ potential uncomfortableness in doing so488—
                                                                                                                          
487 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (discussing the problems with the flexible bar approach), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
488 See, e.g., Plager, supra note 418, at 773–74 (indicating uncomfortableness addressing policy in 
judicial opinions). 
 2013] FORMALISM AND ANTIFORMALSM IN PATENT LAW ADJUDICATION 491 
to ensure appropriate consideration of the value of certainty and rule-based 
adjudication by the Supreme Court. 
b.  Identifying Rule-Like Tests Worthy of Reconsideration 
Second, the Federal Circuit judges should signal when cases enforcing 
rule-based adjudication are worthy of en banc or Supreme Court review.  
Dissenting opinions written by Federal Circuit judges disagreeing with 
panel decisions and especially the en banc court may highlight excessive 
use of rules.  Likewise, parties and scholars should continue to highlight 
overly-formalistic, rule-based holdings of the Federal Circuit.  Amicus 
briefs by non-parties, including individual companies, organizations of 
companies, and organizations of patent attorneys, all should assist both the 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court in vetting rule-bound areas of patent 
law in need of reconsideration.  In short, the Federal Circuit and all other 
interested parties should seek to identify rule-like tests worthy of 
reconsideration by the Federal Circuit prior to the time the Supreme Court 
is asked to review a Federal Circuit decision on point.  In this way, the 
Federal Circuit may police its own preference for rule-based adjudication.  
In addition, the Federal Circuit’s view as to the appropriateness of rule-
based adjudication may be guaranteed to be heard—unlike in KSR where 
the Federal Circuit judges addressed the question of excessive rule-based 
adjudication in one doctrinal area only after the Supreme Court had agreed 
to hear a case on point. 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Role 
Commentators and Federal Circuit judges routinely assign 
responsibility for the development of patent law to the Federal Circuit.  
This view of the role of the Federal Circuit, of course, is improper if it 
implies that the Federal Circuit bears ultimate responsibility for patent law.  
To the extent Congress and the President have given the judiciary 
responsibility for developing patent law,489 it is the Supreme Court that 
bears ultimate responsibility for the law emanating from the judiciary, 
including the Federal Circuit.  Indeed, it is the Supreme Court’s 
responsibility to supervise the Federal Circuit and correct its errant ways 
by granting review of cases and reversing the Federal Circuit when 
appropriate. 
Thus, it is the Supreme Court’s role to question the appropriateness of 
rule-based adjudication when it is adopted by the Federal Circuit, to reject 
it when it is not appropriate, and to provide helpful explanations of its 
decisions to reject rule-based adjudication in favor of standard-based 
adjudication.  As shown, a study of the history of the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                          
489 See Rai, supra note 16, at 1041 (suggesting Congress delegated policymaking responsibility in 
patent law to the judiciary). 
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review of patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court may not have engaged in the proper role of a generalized 
court reviewing a semi-specialized court until relatively recently.490  
The Supreme Court should police the Federal Circuit’s preference for 
rule-based adjudication, but it should do so taking into consideration the 
normative bases supporting rule-based adjudication, and in particular the 
importance of certainty in patent law.  The Supreme Court should 
recognize that it is the expected practice, indeed the preferred practice, of a 
semi-specialized court to consider the appropriateness of rule-based 
adjudication, particularly as the court’s collective experience with legal 
subject matter, and therefore expertise with that legal subject matter, 
increases.  It is the Supreme Court’s role, however, not only to police the 
Federal Circuit’s use of rule-based adjudication, but also to police its own 
preference for standard-based adjudication.  In short, the Supreme Court 
should tend to permit rule-based adjudication when the Federal Circuit’s 
opinions reasonably justify rules in light of the importance of certainty 
given the particular legal doctrine and the affected decision-makers, but 
also to demand standard-based adjudication when they do not. 
a.  Identifying Rule-Like Tests Worthy of Reconsideration 
There are basic things the Supreme Court can and should do to 
increase its effectiveness in policing patent law for excess rule-based 
adjudication.  First, the Supreme Court should expand its traditional bases 
for granting certiorari to the Federal Circuit to include the purpose of 
policing the Federal Circuit’s perceived penchant for rule-based 
adjudication.  Other than the parties’ petitions for certiorari, the Supreme 
Court should look to the dissents of judges at the Federal Circuit, as well as 
amicus briefs for suggestions that patent law doctrines have become 
excessively rule-bound.  The role of the Solicitor General of the United 
States and the Patent Office cannot be overlooked in this regard.491  The 
Supreme Court has made it a practice of requesting the view of the United 
States regarding whether it should grant certiorari in patent cases, and the 
view of the United States is determined by the Solicitor General in 
consultation with various agencies of the federal government, including but 
                                                                                                                          
490 See supra Part IV.B (describing the history of the Supreme Court’s decisions in relation to 
those of the Federal Circuit).  As Professor Golden has pointed out, there is reason to think that the 
Supreme Court is not even a generalized court because of its focus on constitutional and statutory 
interpretation.  Golden, supra note 11, at 674–86.  If he is correct, that only bolsters the idea that the 
Supreme Court should exercise restraint in its review of Federal Circuit decisions to invoke rule-based 
adjudication in patent law. 
491 See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 518, 550–52 (2010) (discussing the importance of the Solicitor General’s Office in 
deciding if patent law doctrines should be altered via Supreme Court review). 
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not limited to the Patent Office.492  Thus, the individuals in those 
government positions should consider whether the Federal Circuit has 
enforced excessive rule-based adjudication in particular patent doctrines 
and report the consensus view to the Supreme Court. 
If rule-based adjudication in patent law is inherently a problem, one 
solution is to make institutional changes with an eye toward overcoming 
the Federal Circuit’s bias towards rules over standards.  For example, as 
discussed above, some have suggested that the Federal Circuit’s caseload 
should be diversified to emphasize general rather than specialized 
jurisdiction, while others have at least raised the possibility of eliminating 
the Federal Circuit.  As a practical matter, at least in the short term, the 
recent influx of new judges without patent law experience or expertise may 
reduce the Federal Circuit’s bias towards rules in patent cases if rule-
making correlates to experience within the field.493  Rule-based 
adjudication in patent cases, however, is not inherently a problem given 
potential justifications for use of rules in patent cases.  And while excess 
rule-based adjudication may be a problem, it may be viewed, not as a 
symptom of underlying problems regarding the institutional structure in 
which the Federal Circuit exists, but as a reflection of the lack of adequate 
oversight by the Supreme Court when the Federal Circuit has engaged in 
rule-based adjudication.  In particular, the Supreme Court should review 
petitions for certiorari to the Federal Circuit with an eye toward identifying 
unjustified rule-based adjudication—use of rules in the absence of policy-
based justifications—and grant a sufficient number of petitions to provide 
the necessary oversight with respect to the plethora of issues that arise in 
patent cases.   
b.  Practicing Humility Through Restraint 
Second, the Supreme Court should be careful to avoid going too far in 
enforcing standard-based adjudication that contradicts well-grounded 
policy justified by the Federal Circuit based on its experience and expertise 
                                                                                                                          
492 See id. at 525–31, 546 (describing increasing calls for the views of the Solicitor General in 
patent cases since 1994 and explaining that “the Solicitor General’s Office can also draw on the 
expertise found elsewhere in the executive branch; it may draw on the [US]PTO’s experience”); Gary 
M. Hoffman & Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases: Placing the 
Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determining if It Will Continue, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. L. 227, 247 (2010) (describing the importance of the views of the Solicitor General).  
493 Three of the four most recently confirmed judges did not have any notable experience with 
patent law prior to joining the court.  See Todd M. Hughes, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/todd-m-hughes-circuit-judge.html (last visited Dec. 2, 
2013) (providing biographical details); Jimmie V. Reyna, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/jimmie-v-reyna-circuit-judge.html (last visited Aug. 25, 
2013) (same); Evan J. Wallach, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/evan-j-wallach-circuit-judge.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2013) 
(same). 
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analyzing issues arising in patent cases.   
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court should consider its own 
limitations in identifying when rule-based adjudication may be appropriate 
as applied to a particular patent law legal issue.  In various remarks, Justice 
Scalia has highlighted his relative inexperience, lack of expertise, and even 
lack of interest in patent law.  For example, in a concurring opinion in 
Cardinal Chemical, he recognized his own inexperience by noting that a 
particular point was “much less tied to general principles of law with 
which I am familiar, and much more related to the peculiarities of patent 
litigation, with which I deal only sporadically.”494  In recent remarks 
reported by the American Bar Association, he conceded his lack of 
knowledge about patent law.495  And in a recent oral argument, he confided 
his view that “[f]ederal judges, including this [f]ederal judge, are not 
interested in . . . getting into the weeds of patent law.”496  There is no 
reason to think that, in these respects, Justice Scalia is not a representative 
sample of the Supreme Court Justices. 
Perhaps in view of its relative inexperience and lack of expertise, the 
Supreme Court may have gone too far in rejecting rule-like tests in favor of 
standard-like tests governing patent law.  In particular, as discussed above, 
two of the Court’s three recent opinions on patent eligibility have rejected 
defined constraints on the relevant decision-makers—patent examiners and 
judges—resulting in the kind of uncertainty and unpredictability that may 
be problematic for a property-based legal system, particularly for patent 
law.  Indeed, as discussed by Professor Golden, the Supreme Court’s 
forays into patent law often result in bad law and uncertainty.497  Thus, 
there are reasons to believe that the Supreme Court should temper its own 
understandable and desirable preference for standard-based adjudication 
when reviewing well-reasoned opinions by the Federal Circuit. 
*** 
At the beginning of the last decade of the Supreme Court’s review of 
Federal Circuit decisions governing patent law, Professor Duffy captured 
the essence of the benefit of adopting the respective roles of the Supreme 
                                                                                                                          
494 Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 103 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
495 Gaëtan Gerville-Réache, Justice Scalia at the AJEI Summit in New Orleans, APP. ISSUES, Feb. 
2013, at 3, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/appellate_issues/201
3win_al.authckeckdam.pdf (quoting Justice Scalia as saying, “I don’t know squat about patents.”). 
496 Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No. 11-1118).  In 
addition to these admissions, Justice Scalia recently decided not to join a majority opinion in a patent 
case dealing with particularly complex science given that he was unable to affirm fine details of 
molecular biology “on [his] own knowledge or even [his] own belief.”  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
497 Golden, supra note 11, at 687–89. 
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Court and Federal Circuit I have identified here: 
[T]he combination of a generalist Supreme Court and a 
specialized appellate court can function—or, at least, can 
function effectively—only if the generalist court’s 
acceptance of its limited competence is matched by the 
specialized court’s acceptance of its limited authority.  In 
other words, the combination can work if each institution 
practices the virtue of humility.498   
A decade after these prescient words, it remains unclear whether the 
two courts have the self-discipline to practice the virtue of humility in the 
context of advancing both certainty and flexibility in patent law.  For the 
sake of the future of the patent system and its need for the right balance of 
certainty and flexibility, let’s hope humility prevails. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have a unique relationship, 
that of a semi-specialized intermediate appellate court and a generalized 
appellate court of last resort.  Given this unique relationship, each court has 
a unique and robust role.  Contrary to most prior scholarship, this Article 
advances the position that, given normative justifications for seeking 
certainty in patent law, the Federal Circuit serves its role in the current 
institutional design when, as a semi-specialized intermediate appellate 
court, it considers the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication in patent 
cases.  In short, the Federal Circuit’s consideration of rule-based 
adjudication is not, in and of itself, a problem.  Indeed, it is the expected 
and preferred approach of a semi-specialized intermediate appellate court.   
This Article also advances the position, however, that it is the Supreme 
Court’s fundamental responsibility to police the Federal Circuit’s 
preference for rule-based adjudication.  This policing function, while 
complex, should include two changes to the Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudential approach to patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit.  
First, the Supreme Court should expand its traditional bases for granting 
certiorari to include the purpose of policing the Federal Circuit’s 
preference for rule-based adjudication.  Second, the Supreme Court should 
be careful to avoid going too far in enforcing standard-based adjudication 
that contradicts well-grounded policy justified by the Federal Circuit based 
on its experience and expertise analyzing issues arising in patent cases.  In 
this regard, the Supreme Court would do well not to forget the statement it 
made nearly one hundred years ago in an intellectual property case: 
“Uniformity and certainty in rules of property are often more important 
                                                                                                                          
498 Duffy, supra note 235, at 342. 
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and desirable than technical correctness.”499 
                                                                                                                          
499 Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. W.A. Gaines & Co., 246 U.S. 312, 320 (1918) (quoting Layton 
Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 35, 39 (8th Cir. 1910)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
